Racial Mirroring by Sidhu, Dawinder S.
  
1335 
RACIAL MIRRORING 
Dawinder S. Sidhu* 
ABSTRACT 
“Racial mirroring” refers to efforts by one group to match the primary racial composition of another 
group.  In contrast to racial balancing, which takes place when two groups are adjusted 
simultaneously to achieve a desired degree of racial equilibrium between them, racial mirroring 
occurs when the racial makeup of one group is adjusted so as to reflect the predominant racial 
identity of the second group.  
Employers and even federal courts engage in racial mirroring.  For example, in order to generate 
trust among customers, employers have hired or promoted individuals of the same race as the 
employers’ primary customer base.  Further, in order to ensure that attorneys can fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of their clients, a federal district court judge required counsel in 
class action cases to staff attorneys that reflect the racial diversity of the clients.  Federal appellate 
courts have approved these twin forms of racial mirroring.  
This Article challenges employer and judicial attempts to match the racial identity of one group to 
the primary racial identity of another.  It argues that these practices, however intuitive and well-
intentioned, violate the Equal Protection Clause, embody harmful racial stereotypes, and generate 
significant social costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The deaths of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, in 
Ferguson, Missouri, and of Eric Garner, an unarmed black man, in 
Staten Island, New York, both at the hands of white police officers, 
have catalyzed racial tensions across the country.  Recommendations 
for how those tensions may be eased, and for how a more harmoni-
ous multiracial nation may emerge, soon followed. 
One suggestion concerns the racial composition of predominantly 
white police departments in predominantly African-American neigh-
borhoods.  Ferguson has 21,000 residents, 67% of whom are black.1  
Ferguson’s police force has fifty-three officers, only four of whom, or 
7%, are black.2  Seizing on these figures, some have proposed that the 
Ferguson police department, and similar police departments in other 
 
 1 See Rebecca Leber, Ferguson’s Police Force Is 94 Percent White—And That’s Basically Normal in 
the U.S., THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
119070/michael-browns-death-leads-scrutiny-ferguson-white-police. 
 2 News outlets reported that African Americans only made up 5.6% of the Ferguson police 
force, which is three officers out of the fifty-three on the force. See, e.g., id.  With focus on 
the racial composition of the Ferguson police department, other news outlets clarified 
that there are four black officers on the fifty-three-member force.  See, e.g., Steve 
Contorno et al., PunditFact Fact-Checks The Aug. 17 News Shows, POLITIFACT (Aug. 17, 2014, 
5:41 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2014/aug/17/punditfact-
fact-checks-aug-17-news-shows/. 
May 2015] RACIAL MIRRORING 1337 
 
cities, should reflect the racial demographics of their served commu-
nities.  Former NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly, for example, encour-
aged this mutuality of racial identity, claiming that it makes for “easi-
er” and “smarter” policing.3 
This argument may be restated in general terms:  Trust is the 
touchstone of effective policing.4  In communities of color, that trust 
has been undermined by the painful legacy and stubborn persistence 
of actual or perceived racial discrimination in law enforcement.  Ac-
cordingly, communities of color confronted by a predominantly non-
black police force may assume that the police force is biased and that 
such bias will work its way into adverse law enforcement decisions.  
This view erodes confidence in the police which, in turn, makes 
communities of color less inclined to communicate with and support 
law enforcement. 
By contrast, communities of color may be more receptive to a po-
lice force that looks like them and that does not embody actual or 
perceived bias.  A shared racial makeup thereby may help foster trust 
which, in turn, may facilitate cooperation between law enforcement 
and people of color.  In other words, a mutuality of racial identity 
may yield better policing outcomes, the argument goes. 
From this overview, it seems tough to argue with the proposed 
matching of the racial identity of the police force with the predomi-
nant racial makeup of the town or city, or with the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that “[t]he composition 
and operation of an effective police force should be in as complete 
harmony as possible with the community from which it springs.”5  It 
seems similarly difficult to contest the “external legitimacy” doctrine, 
the general principle behind the specific police department sugges-
tion.  Under this doctrine, employers may give special consideration 
to job applicants of the same race as the clients that the employer 
serves because employees of the same race will be able to generate 
 
 3 This Week with George Stephanopoulos:  Aftermath of the Darren Wilson Grand Jury Decision (ABC 
News television broadcast Nov. 30, 2014), available at http://abc.go.com/shows/this-
week-with-george-stephanopoulos/listing/2014-11/30-this-week-1130-aftermath-of-the-
darren-wilson-grand-jury-decision. 
 4 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY 
POLICING:  A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, at vii (1994), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/commp.pdf (“A foundation of trust will allow police to form close relationships 
with the community that will produce solid achievements.  Without trust between police 
and citizens, effective policing is impossible.”) 
 5 Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 
(2004) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. City of Chicago, 663 
F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
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trust and cooperation among the clients and thus boost the “external 
legitimacy” of the employer.6 
Attempts to ensure that individuals in one defined group reflect 
the racial composition of another group may be termed “racial mir-
roring.”7  Suggestions that police departments echo the racial diversi-
ty of the city or town is an example of this practice.  Despite the intui-
tive promise of racial mirroring, including in the police context, I am 
afraid that racial mirroring violates the Equal Protection Clause,8 
perpetuates harmful racial stereotypes, and therefore produces signif-
icant legal and social costs. The purpose of this Article is to explain 
this constitutional and extra-legal—and admittedly unwelcome—
conclusion. 
Racial mirroring produces three sets of distinction costs:  (1) 
those affecting the individuals seeking particular opportunities (indi-
vidual costs), (2) those affecting all others (social costs), and (3) 
those affecting the courts (judicial costs). 
First, racial mirroring imposes costs on individuals who are candi-
dates for particular opportunities.  With respect to the individual who 
is given the position for “external legitimacy” reasons, racial mirror-
ing enables decisionmakers to categorically presume that the candi-
date, solely because of his or her racial identity, has the qualities 
 
 6 See, e.g., Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114–15 (discussing how minority representation in the police 
force is critical for its effective operation because the minority population will exhibit 
greater trust and confidence in the police force).  The term “external legitimacy” in this 
context may be attributed to Professor Cynthia Estlund’s important article in this area.  
Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work:  Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in 
the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2005) (referring to the “external legit-
imacy” argument, or the “business case for diversity,” which “points to the increasingly di-
verse nature of firms’ external constituencies—its clientele and contractors—and the 
credibility, legitimacy, and cultural knowledge that a diverse workforce brings to the pro-
ject of capturing and cultivating those external constituencies”). 
 7 “Racial mirroring” is distinct from “racial balancing.”  In “racial balancing,” the racial 
composition of two groups is adjusted with the purpose of achieving an acceptable range 
of racial diversity within the two groups.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–12, 720–22 (2007) (striking down the school districts’ poli-
cy which made transfer decisions between schools on the basis of race—in order to en-
sure that no school was racially isolated (i.e., having insufficient numbers of students 
from racial minority groups) or racially concentrated (i.e., having insufficient numbers of 
non-minority students)—because it was not narrowly tailored to a compelling govern-
ment interest).  The Court has held that when the racial mixing is done “for its own sa-
ke,” it is discrimination.   Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) 
(opinion of Powell, J.).  In contrast, “racial mirroring” occurs when the racial composi-
tion of only one side is adjusted to reflect the racial composition of some other, ostensibly 
static group.  Further, the purpose is usually to derive some benefit from the racial identi-
ties being in lockstep. 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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tending to produce “external legitimacy” among clients of the same 
race, without regard to the actual characteristics of the candidate.  
This problem is one of using and perpetuating racial stereotypes as to 
the existence of some desired quality (the “positive presumption” 
problem). 
Racial mirroring also expects this candidate, once hired or other-
wise retained, to “perform” or exhibit the traits and behaviors—
presumed to exist on account of his or her race—that may foster trust 
and cooperation.  This is a problem of demanding performance 
based on race (the “performance” problem). 
With respect to the candidate who is denied the opportunity, ra-
cial mirroring enables decisionmakers to presume that only individu-
als of the shared race can produce external trust, and thereby pre-
sumes as a corollary that individuals of other races lack the desired 
ability to generate external trust and cooperation.  This is a problem 
of using and perpetuating racial stereotypes as to the non-existence 
of some desired quality (the “negative presumption” problem). 
In addition, the operation of these presumptions is the functional 
exclusion of the second candidate from equal consideration.  This is 
a problem of denying equal opportunity on the basis of race (the 
“equal consideration” problem). 
With respect to both candidates, in invoking a categorical or au-
tomatic presumption, the decisionmaker not only drives whether an 
individual’s race is taken into account but also determines the sub-
stantive meaning of the individual’s race in that decision-making pro-
cess.  The decisionmaker imposes meaning on the racial identities of 
both candidates.  This is a problem of defining for the individual 
whether, and how, his or her race matters (the “race defining” prob-
lem). 
Second, the “external legitimacy” doctrine imposes costs on oth-
ers.  Racial mirroring precludes decisionmakers, the decisionmakers’ 
clients, and the broader public from understanding and appreciating 
that an individual of any race may possess the qualities and attributes 
that may produce trust and cooperation, even if the individual is of a 
race that differs from the predominant race of the served community.  
This problem is one of actively feeding and fostering, rather than 
dismantling and breaking down, racial stereotypes (the “stereotype 
entrenchment” problem). 
Racial mirroring also eases the pathway for individuals of the de-
sired race to possess an opportunity, as if the role is the presumptive 
or exclusive province of individuals of the desired race, and also 
stands as a barrier to entry for individuals of other racial identities 
who aspire to have the same opportunity.  This is a problem of de-
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termining whether social roles are reserved for members of a given 
race (the “role exclusion” problem). 
Third, with respect to the courts, racial mirroring uses the judicial 
system as an instrument to validate the racial presumptions relied 
upon by the decisionmaker.  This problem is one of utilizing the 
courts as a conduit for privately held racial stereotypes (the “judicial 
validation” problem). 
These points indicate, individually and in combination, that there 
are cognizable harms to mirroring the racial identity of the individu-
als with that of the served constituency, and these harms extend to 
the desired racial group, the undesired racial group, society at large, 
and the courts.  It confirms the Supreme Court’s prophetic warning 
to be wary of simple fixes to issues of race.9 As these harms are of a 
constitutional order, they necessarily outweigh any social interest in 
or exigent desire for racial mirroring. 
This Article proceeds in the following steps: 
Part I provides an overview of the “external legitimacy” doctrine 
and summarizes judicial and scholarly opinion finding that the doc-
trine is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 
Part II details the three categories of harms previously mentioned 
and suggests that the “external legitimacy” doctrine cannot be sus-
tained, in an equal protection challenge, because of those harms. 
Part III then applies this analysis of the “external legitimacy” doc-
trine to the police department suggestion made by former Commis-
sioner Kelly and others, finding that there are serious constitutional 
problems with the suggestion.  This Part also identifies two limitations 
on the reach of objections to racial mirroring.  While the problems 
with racial mirroring apply in principle to both the tribal employ-
ment and affirmative action contexts, neither context may be chal-
lenged with reference to these problems.  For tribal employment, this 
is because special statutory protections shield employers on or near 
tribal lands from the ordinary operation of pertinent anti-
discrimination principles.  For affirmative action, this is because per-
missible race-conscious admissions is not premised upon an interest 
in ensuring that the racial diversity of a student body reflects the ra-
cial diversity of the local or general population, which would consti-
tute racial mirroring, but is instead allowed on another basis, namely 
producing the educational benefits of a diverse student body. 
 
 9 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952) (“Only those lacking responsible 
humility will have a confident solution for problems as intractable as the frictions at-
tributable to differences of race.”). 
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Part IV answers the question of what next.  It suggests that race 
may not be considered pursuant to categorical presumptions.  In-
stead, employers and others should probe whether the individual 
possesses the desired traits in actuality; this inquiry should be based 
on the individual’s demonstrable record and not inferred from his or 
her race. 
While the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of 
racial balancing,10 it has never squarely confronted the constitutional-
ity of racial mirroring.  It is hoped that this Article may be useful to 
the bench and the bar in considering challenges to the practice of 
racial mirroring.  In light of calls for racial mirroring in the policing 
context, the moment seems ripe for such guidance. 
I.  “EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY” 
The Equal Protection Clause generally guarantees that similarly 
situated individuals be treated equally by public institutions.11  That 
said, a public institution may be allowed to treat similarly situated in-
dividuals differently provided that there is a sufficient justification for 
the different treatment and the means used bears a sufficiently close 
relationship to that justification.12  If the different treatment is prem-
ised upon race, the justification must be “compelling” and the means 
must be “narrowly tailored” to the compelling purpose.13  This form 
of review—strict scrutiny—is to be searching and exacting—fatal in 
form, but not in fact.14 
 
 10 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“[R]acial balancing . . . is patently un-
constitutional.”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“If petitioner’s purpose is 
to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely 
because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as 
insubstantial but as facially invalid.  Preferring members of any one group for no reason 
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.  This the Constitution 
forbids.”). 
 11 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Pro-
tection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.”). 
 12 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (“When those who appear 
similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause re-
quires at least a rational reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to 
legislation or regulation are indeed being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and 
conditions.’” (citations omitted)). 
 13 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifica-
tions, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.” (citations omitted)). 
 14 See id. at 237 (“[The court] wish[es] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact.’” (citations omitted)). 
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Public employers have claimed, under this equal protection ru-
bric, that promoting the employer’s credibility among the local 
community is a compelling reason to use race in employment deci-
sions.  In particular, these employers have argued that buy-in from 
the local community is necessary to the effective operation of the 
employer’s services, and as a result the employers should be able to 
give special consideration in hiring or promotion to an employee of 
the same, predominant race of the local community members.15  This 
Part provides an overview of judicial and academic support for this 
argument, and of their specific determinations that the “external le-
gitimacy” doctrine is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 
A.  Judicial Support for “External Legitimacy” 
Perhaps one of the more significant examples of “external legiti-
macy’s” use and approval is Petit v. City of Chicago.16  In this case, the 
Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) sought to promote racial minor-
ities to the rank of sergeant.17  A number of non-minority officers who 
were denied the promotion filed suit under the Equal Protection 
Clause.18  The CPD defended its actions on the grounds that the 
promotions “were necessary to maintain the operational effectiveness 
of the CPD.”19  The district court agreed,20 and the U.S. Court of Ap-
 
 15 In this respect, the “external legitimacy” doctrine is not “racial balancing,” which occurs 
when the racial composition of a body is done to reflect a static group “for its own sake.”  
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).  The “external legitimacy” doctrine falls 
under the banner of “racial mirroring” because the reflection is accomplished ostensibly 
to achieve trust and cooperation among the served constituents.  This suggests that “ra-
cial mirroring” can be a form of racial capitalism.  See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2152 (2013) (defining racial capitalism as “the process of deriving so-
cial and economic value from the racial identity of another person”). 
 16 352 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004).  I highlight this 
case in part because it not only embodies the “external legitimacy” principle, but also be-
cause it has been singled out by others for its importance.  See, e.g., Jared M. Mellott, 
Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter:  The Case for 
Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1129 (2006) (“Petit’s reference to Grutter signi-
fied a more expansive understanding of the diversity rationale in employment than the 
earlier Seventh Circuit cases had embraced.”); Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justi-
fication, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 221 (2004) (“Petit is an im-
portant example of the way in which Grutter can be extended beyond the educational 
context and into the public sector workplace.”). 
 17 Petit, 352 F.3d at 1112. 
 18 Id. (“[N]onminority Chicago police officers . . . alleged that the affirmative action plan 
implemented in connection with that examination deprived them of the equal protection 
of the law.”). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Petit v. City of Chicago, 239 F. Supp. 2d 761, 788 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Consistent with the 
instructions given at the trial, the Seventh Circuit subsequently held that a police de-
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peals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that there is a “compel-
ling need for diversity in a large metropolitan police force charged 
with protecting a racially and ethnically divided major American city 
like Chicago” and that the “City of Chicago has set out a compelling 
operational need for a diverse police department.”21  The Seventh 
Circuit, favorably recounting the testimony of a criminal justice and 
community policing expert, noted that 
[t]he reality of urban policing is that minorities are frequently mistrustful 
of police and are more willing than nonminorities to believe that the po-
lice engage in misconduct . . . . [N]onminorities have more favorable 
opinions about the CPD than do minorities.  Distrust and a lack of confi-
dence in the police, in turn, reduce the willingness of some community 
members to cooperate with the police.  On the other hand, when police 
officers are routinely supervised by minorities, the fears that the police 
department is hostile to the minority community will naturally abate.22 
The Seventh Circuit also cited approvingly to “high-ranking CPD 
officials,” who 
confirmed the need for diversity at the sergeant rank and [asserted] that 
sergeants are in a unique position to influence officers on the street.  
These officals testified that the presence of minority sergeants has not 
only improved police-community cooperation, but also defused poten-
tially explosive situations, such as the tense racial situation following riots 
in the 1980’s in a predominately Hispanic community . . . [and] recount-
ed the growth in the minority population of the City and the fact that 
minority representation at the sergeant rank had not kept pace with that 
growth.23 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit referred to two of its prior decisions 
for the proposition that “a visible presence of minorities in superviso-
ry positions is critical to effective policing in a racially diverse city like 
Chicago because supervisors set the tone for the department.”24  In 
one of those cases, the circuit court stated that “[e]ffective police 
work, including the detection and apprehension of criminals, re-
quires that the police have the trust of the community and they are 
more likely to have it if they have ‘ambassadors’ to the community of 
the same [race or] ethnicity.”25  In the second, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that “[t]he composition and operation of an effective police 
force should be in as complete harmony as possible with the commu-
 
partment’s operational need for diversity in its workforce can be a compelling interest for 
engaging in affirmative action promotions.” (citations omitted)). 
 21 Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114. 
 22 Id. at 1115. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530 (7th 
Cir. 2002)). 
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nity from which it springs.”26  The Seventh Circuit therefore conclud-
ed that the “CPD had a compelling interest in a diverse population at 
the rank of sergeant in order to set the proper tone in the depart-
ment and to earn the trust of the community, which in turn increases 
police effectiveness in protecting the city.”27  For the narrowly tailored 
prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, the court focused on the fact that 
the CPD “standardized the scores based on race” after noticing that 
the promotion test scores would have resulted in modest promotions 
for minority officers.28  The Seventh Circuit held that adjustment was 
a permissible means to effectuate its compelling interest in a racially 
diverse sergeant corps.29 
Elsewhere, the Seventh Circuit has sanctioned employers’ use of 
race on “external legitimacy” grounds.30  For example, the circuit 
court ruled that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a correctional 
facility in search of lieutenants for a “boot camp” aimed at younger 
inmates could prefer African Americans where the inmates were 
overwhelmingly African American.31  Judge Richard A. Posner, writ-
ing for the court, credited defense experts who claimed that the 
“boot camp . . . would not succeed in its mission of pacification and 
reformation with as white a staff as it would have had if a black male 
had not been appointed to one of the lieutenant slots.”32 
Other courts of appeals have joined the Seventh Circuit in endors-
ing race-based considerations for external legitimacy/internal opera-
tions reasons in the law enforcement context.33  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for instance, ruled that a city police 
 
 26 Petit, 352 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. City of Chicago, 
663 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 1117. 
 29 Id. at 1117–18. 
 30 It is worth emphasizing that, in these cases, the government’s rationale for using race is 
not tied to any past, intentional discrimination that it is now attempting to remedy.  For 
one such case, see, e.g., McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(approving the remedial use of race upon evidence of the “City’s discrimination against 
blacks and Hispanics in the past . . . .).  Rather, the government’s argument is founded 
on the forward-looking belief that the employee of the same race as the clients will im-
prove the relationship between the employer-clients, and will thereby enhance the ability 
of the employer to do its job.  For example, in Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, the Seventh 
Circuit specified that the interests of the police department were to “creat[e] a truly rep-
resentative force and better prepar[e] all officers for culturally-diverse interaction in the 
community they serve.”  474 F.3d 437, 445 n.10 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 31 Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917–19 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 32 Id. at 920. 
 33 At least one circuit stated specifically that it is not expressing any opinion as to whether it 
agrees with Petit.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 
949, 964 n.18 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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department could give preference to an African-American applicant 
for major, as the appointment of an African American to this “policy-
making position would benefit a city whose population was approxi-
mately 50% black.”34  In reaching this decision, the Fourth Circuit 
quoted approvingly from a Sixth Circuit opinion in a similar case in-
volving the “operational needs of an urban police department serving 
a multi-racial [sic] population”35: 
The argument that police need more minority officers is not simply that 
blacks communicate better with blacks or that a police department 
should cater to the public’s desires.  Rather, it is that effective crime pre-
vention and solution depend heavily on the public support and coopera-
tion which result only from public respect and confidence in the police.  
In short, the focus is not on the superior performance of minority offic-
ers, but on the public’s perception of law enforcement officials and insti-
tutions.36 
In an oft-cited case in this area of law, the Second Circuit struck a 
similar chord.  The court “recognized that a law enforcement body’s 
need to carry out its mission effectively, with a workforce that appears 
unbiased, is able to communicate with the public and is respected by 
the community it serves, may constitute a compelling state interest” in 
satisfaction of the Equal Protection Clause.37  To be sure, the Second 
Circuit has insisted that “[t]he mere assertion of an ‘operational 
need’ to make race-conscious employment decisions does not . . . give 
a police department carte blanche to dole out work assignments based 
on race if no such justification is established.”38  Rather, the need 
must be factually supported and the decisions themselves must be 
narrowly tailored to the need.39  Moreover, in another case concern-
 
 34 Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. (quoting Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979)). 
 37 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 52 (2nd Cir. 2002) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 
(2nd Cir. 1988)).  But also Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 300 (5th Cir. 
1968) (holding that “a Department’s practice of assigning Negroes solely on the basis of 
race to a Negro enclave” offends the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Murray v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 06–C–1372, 2011 WL 382694, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 31, 2011) (holding that while “it is proper to consider the race of applicants, the ra-
cial makeup of the community, and diversity when selecting police personnel . . . in cer-
tain circumstances,” the state, in this case, had “not made any showing of a compelling in-
terest, nor ha[d] they established that the existence of a compelling interest is an 
undisputed fact”). 
 38 Patrolmen’s, 310 F.3d at 52. 
 39 See id. at 53 (“The justification must be substantiated by objective evidence—mere specu-
lation or conjecture is insufficient . . . . Further, the race-based measure must be narrowly 
tailored to serve the identified interest.”).  The court ultimately agreed with the jury that 
the race-based assignments were not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state inter-
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ing the promotion of African-American police officers, the First Cir-
cuit stated that it was “sympathetic to the argument that communities 
place more trust in a diverse police force and that the resulting trust 
reduces crime rates and improves policing.”40 
The Third Circuit in Lomack v. City of Newark did not, however, ex-
tend the “external legitimacy” doctrine to fire departments.41  The 
Third Circuit pointed out that there was no evidence that “diversity 
within individual fire companies is in any other way necessary, or 
even beneficial, to the Fire Department’s mission of fighting fires, i.e., 
that the Department has an operational need for diverse fire compa-
nies . . . .”42  Similarly, the Second Circuit invalidated an assignment 
by a civil service commission, where the assignment was “based on a 
racial stereotype that blacks work better with blacks,” “on the premise 
that [the plaintiff’s] race was directly related to his ability to do the 
job,” and on the belief that “his race . . . specially qualif[ied] him for 
the work.”43  Insofar as the courts are concerned, these two cases 
speak to the limits of the “external legitimacy” doctrine outside of the 
police and prison contexts. 
That said, one judge has not only validated, but mandated, racial 
mirroring even outside of these two contexts.  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 requires federal district court judges to “appoint class 
counsel” and authorizes said judges to consider, in appointing class 
counsel, “any . . . matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class.”44  Pursuant to this 
rule, U.S. District Judge Harold Baer, Jr., issued an order stating that 
“[i]n consideration of other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to 
fairly and adequately represent the class, [class counsel] should en-
sure that the lawyers staffed on the case fairly reflect the class compo-
sition in terms of relevant race . . . metrics.”45  The Second Circuit af-
 
est in operational need, particularly as there was no evidence supporting the operational 
need here.  Id. at 52–54. 
 40 Cotter v. City of Boston, 323 F.3d 160, 172 n.10 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 41 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 42 Id.; see also Dietz v. Baker, 523 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (D. Del. 2007) (ruling that summary 
judgment was inappropriate where a question of fact existed as to whether race could be 
justified for operational needs purposes). 
 43 Knight v. Nassau Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
 44 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). 
 45 Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09–CV–10035, 2011 WL 1194707, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 29, 2011).  The class certification order extended to “race and gender metrics,” id., 
though the legality or propriety of ensuring that employees reflect the gender of clients is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  It should be noted that Judge Baer has issued similar 
orders in previous cases.  See Martin v. Blessing, 134 S. Ct. 402, 403 (2013) (citing Public 
Employees’ Retirement Sys. of Miss. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., No. 09 CV 1110, 280 
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firmed the order46 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.47  Justice 
Samuel A. Alito issued a statement on the denial of certiorari in a 
class action suit.48  Justice Alito found it necessary to clarify that while 
the Court denied certiorari, “the meaning of the Court’s denial of 
the petition should not be misunderstood.”49  He signaled to Judge 
Baer—and all other federal judges—that the class certification order 
was both unjustifiable and impractical.  Unjustifiable, as Justice Alito 
stated that he was “hard-pressed to see any ground on which Judge 
Baer’s practice can be defended”50 and he found it “quite farfetched 
to argue that class counsel cannot fairly and adequately represent a 
class unless the race. . . of counsel mirror[s] the demographics of the 
class.”51  Impractical, as Justice Alito suggested that the order, if en-
forced, would “complicate” the appointment process and produce 
“bizarre results.”52  Ultimately, Justice Alito cautioned that, if the or-
der was not sufficiently addressed on remand, “future review may be 
warranted.”53 
Racial mirroring in class certification may be seen as anomalous.  
Federal courts have routinely endorsed racial mirroring in the polic-
ing and prison contexts.  Scholars, as with Judge Baer, are not as con-
strained in their assessment as to the desirable scope of racial mirror-
ing. 
B.  Academic Support for “External Legitimacy” 
The logic of the “external legitimacy” doctrine reaches any posi-
tion where external trust or cooperation is important to the internal 
 
F.R.D. 130, 142 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2012); N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Residential 
Capital, LLC, Nos. 08 CV 8781, 08 CV 5093, 2012 WL 4865174, at *5, n.5 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 
15, 2012); In re Gildan Activewear Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 5048 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 
2010)). 
 46 Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,  507 Fed. App’x 1, (2d Cir. 2012).  The panel held that 
the appellants lacked standing to challenge the order.  Id. at 6. 
 47 Martin, 134 S. Ct. at 402. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 402. 
 50 Id. at 403. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Martin, 134 S. Ct. at 403–04. 
 53 Id. at 405.  Prior to Justice Alito’s involvement, other scholars had been critical of Judge 
Baer’s attempts to ensure that class counsel reflect the racial diversity of the clients.  See, 
e.g., Michael H. Hurwitz, Judge Harold Baer’s Quixotic Crusade for Class Counsel Diversity, 17 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 321, 327–29 (2011) (describing problems with Judge Baer’s 
“class counsel diversity requirement”). 
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operation of the employer.54  Indeed, some scholars are of the opin-
ion that Petit should permeate other areas of employment.55  Ivan E. 
Bodensteiner suggests, for example, that Petit ostensibly could be ex-
tended to all municipal services:  “credibility and trust are important 
to the successful operation of a municipality, [and] expert testimony 
may establish a compelling need for diversity in departments of a 
municipality that provide municipal services.”56  David Orentlicher 
likewise contends that “diversity in the workplace would be beneficial 
in other public agencies whose employees have frequent interaction 
with a diverse public.”57 
Perhaps the strongest appeal for the use of race by an employer 
for “external legitimacy” purposes outside of the police and penal 
contexts has been put forward by Shani M. King.58  In particular, Pro-
fessor King argues that “legal services organizations that serve large 
populations of African-American clients should employ staff attorneys 
who are most likely to engender trust and facilitate communication 
with their clients.  Consequently, these organizations should employ 
African-American staff attorneys.”59  Professor King posits, “If [legal 
services] organizations reflect the racial and ethnic make-up of the 
 
 54 See Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a “Post-Racial” World, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 833, 847–48 (2011) (“There is no reason to believe African American or Latino fire-
fighters perform their jobs differently from white firefighters, and there is no particular 
reason to believe that the community might be concerned with the race of firefighters.  
Unlike a police department, where community cooperation and language skills can be 
central to effective operations, no one is likely to turn away a fire truck because of the 
race of the firefighters, and other than in fire investigations, there is not a strong need for 
community cooperation.”); Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading 
Cases III:  Federal Statutes and Regulations—Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 123 HARV. L. REV. 282, 
292 (2009) (“[T]he racial composition of a fire department is largely irrelevant to its abil-
ity to protect the public from fire.”). 
 55 See Angela Brouse, The Last Call for Diversity in Law Firms:  Is it Legal?, 75 UMKC L. Rev. 
847, 847–48 (2007) (private law firms); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:  A 
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1076 n.67 (2006) 
(military and business organizations); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges:  Racial Diversity, 
Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 98–99 (1997) (state 
trial court judges); Stuart J. Ishimaru, Fulfilling the Promise of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 25, 39 (2005) (law enforcement, the judiciary, the media, and 
education). 
 56 Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Although Risky After Ricci and Parents Involved, Benign Race-Conscious 
Action is Often Necessary, 22 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 28 (2009). 
 57 David Orentlicher, Diversity:  A Fundamental American Principle, 70 MO. L. REV. 777, 804, 
805 n.145 (2005). 
 58 See Shani M. King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility:  Why Legal Services Organiza-
tions Need African-American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2008). 
 59 Id. at 3–4; see also id. at 54–55 (“[L]egal services organizations that represent large popula-
tions of black Americans should be race conscious and hire more black lawyers”). 
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populations that they serve, African-American clients are more likely 
to consider these organizations credible and legitimate.”60 
From this overview, it is clear that the “external legitimacy” ra-
tionale for race-conscious hiring—the notion that an individual of 
the same race as the clients or customer base will enhance the credi-
bility of the employer and allow the employer to be more effective—
has been embraced by courts and scholars alike, with the latter gen-
erally advancing a more expansive view of the doctrine than the for-
mer.61 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH “EXTERNAL LEGITIMACY” 
In this Part, I will introduce the reader to three categories of 
harms that counsel against the use of the “external legitimacy.”62 
A running hypothetical may be helpful in conceptualizing these 
problems.  The courts have found the “external legitimacy” doctrine 
constitutional in the law enforcement and prison contexts, and 
scholars have argued for the constitutionality of the doctrine’s use in 
other areas in which trust and cooperation from the served commu-
nity are deemed essential.  The hypothetical uses another field in 
which that relationship is important to the effectiveness of the service 
provider’s functions. 
Let us assume that an urban elementary school in a predominant-
ly African-American neighborhood has an opening for a second-
grade teacher.63  The school has two qualified applicants—an African 
 
 60 Id. at 38; see also id. at 40 (“[Legal services] organizations should hire African-American 
attorneys in order to establish the external legitimacy which is necessary if they are to 
gain their clients’ trust.”). 
 61 Public commentators have argued in favor of “external legitimacy” outside of the domes-
tic employment context.  For example, in the foreign policy space, some have suggested 
that the United States must counter violent extremism by giving support to locals “who 
can credibly deflate extremists’ messages . . . .”  Manal Omar, The United States Will Never 
Win the Propaganda War Against the Islamic State, FOREIGN POLICY, Jan. 9, 2015, available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/09/the-united-states-will-never-win-the-propaganda-
war-against-the-islamic-state/. 
 62 The only exception is in tribal employment, as tribes are protected by special considera-
tions owing to their unique status.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 63 This hypothetical is selected for four reasons.  First, it is the type of non-commercial, 
community-based employers that advocates of the external legitimacy doctrine suggest 
have the greatest claim to this theory.  See Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the 
Workplace:  The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 267 (2003–2004).  Second, it is simi-
lar to the legal services organization example used by Professor King, though deliberately 
different in order for the reader to view and appraise the application of the external legit-
imacy argument in another non-commercial, community-based context.  Third, it at-
tempts to depart from the traditional frame of white (the “insider” racial group) and mi-
norities (the “outsider” racial group), where this white/minority paradigm itself tends to 
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American and an Asian American—where the threshold require-
ments to be “qualified” are a college degree and a valid, active teach-
ing certificate.  The school principal and the rest of the school’s hir-
ing committee express interest in hiring the African-American 
candidate, resting this interest on the “external legitimacy” argument.  
In particular, as to the current state of affairs, the school officials per-
ceive that cooperation between the parents and the school has been 
modest. But the officials believe that the African-American candidate 
will increase buy-in from parents and this buy-in will yield enhanced 
educational outcomes in two respects:  first, focusing on the school 
itself, the officials have a strong sense that will enhance the possibility 
that predominantly African-American parents will trust the educa-
tional choices of teachers, will become more involved in school gov-
ernance and policy development, and will enrich the educational and 
extra-curricular activities of the school, for example, through volun-
teering to coach sports teams or advise student clubs; second, focus-
ing outside of school, the school officials assume that engaged par-
ents will implement the teacher’s suggestions as to how they can best 
support the student at home, will be invested in creating optimal ed-
ucational conditions for the student, and will actively assist the stu-
dents with their daily assignments.64  The school officials contend that 
the buy-in, facilitated by the African-American candidate, will enable 
the school to do its job more effectively.65  Accordingly, the African-
American candidate is hired.66 
 
predetermine the merits of the doctrine.  Fourth, and practically speaking, this hypothet-
ical is based on the actual experiences of a good friend and former colleague who is a 
grade school teacher, thanks to Teach for America, in a major metropolitan majority-
minority city. 
 64 The school officials’ assumptions are not uncommon.  At least historically, school districts 
believed that “minority teachers were better teachers for minority students.”  Wendy Par-
ker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2008).  Further, African-American 
teachers preferred to teach African-American students.  See id. 
 65 Even if there is the possibility of improved educational outcomes for students and dimin-
ished expectations by teachers, state action must still remain within the bounds of the 
Constitution.  For a discussion of the constitutional costs of racial matching, see. Thomas 
S. Dee, The Race Connection:  Are Teachers More Effective with Students Who Share Their Ethnici-
ty?, EDUC. NEXT, 53 (2004) (“Black students learn more from black teachers and white 
students from white teachers, suggesting that the racial dynamics within classrooms may 
contribute to the persistent racial gap in student performance. . . .”); Thomas S. Dee, A 
Teacher Like Me:  Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter?, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 158, 159 (2005) 
(determining that teachers of different races than the students tend to have lower expec-
tations of those students). 
 66 The potential for this racial matching is not merely hypothetical.  See Alan M. Lerner, Law 
& Lawyering in the Work Place:  Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to Exercise Critical 
Judgment as Creative Problem Solver, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107, 107–08 (1999) (describing a sit-
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This scenario runs afoul of the following principles that stem from 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. 
A.  Individual Costs 
1.  The Positive Presumption Problem 
The school officials are presuming, solely on the basis of race, that 
the African-American candidate will generate trust and cooperation 
from African-American parents.  The presumption does not rest on 
the actual qualities of the candidate, for example his or her social 
skills, his or her ability to work with parents, or a demonstrated com-
mitment to students or minorities.  Instead, the race of the applicant 
is used as a proxy for these qualities.67 
The employer’s action is inconsistent with prevailing Supreme 
Court Equal Protection Doctrine.  In the seminal case of Shaw v. Re-
no, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a North 
Carolina reapportionment plan that would have included two majori-
ty-black congressional districts.68  The plan ostensibly was designed to 
give voting strength to African-American voters in North Carolina, 
who were otherwise dispersed throughout the state.69  In other words, 
the plan had its root in a purpose beneficial to African-American vot-
ers. 
The Court held that the districts, which were oddly shaped in or-
der to encompass prospective African-American voters “who are oth-
erwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries,”70 
gave rise to a valid claim of improper racial gerrymandering under 
the Equal Protection Clause.71  The Court reasoned that the majority-
minority redistricting plan “reinforces the perception that members 
of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, eco-
nomic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share 
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the 
 
uation in which the only African-American students in a particular class were all assigned 
to a section taught by the only African-American teacher available in that grade). 
 67 Social science indicates that individuals exhibit in-group bias, including the belief that 
members of the same group are more trustworthy.  See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, 
A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1739–40 (2006).  The employer in 
this hypothetical could be acting pursuant to this bias and/or, citing to such studies, op-
erating under the supported belief that the customer base will possess this bias. 
 68 509 U.S. 630, 633–34 (1993). 
 69 Id. at 634–35. 
 70 Id. at 647. 
 71 Id. at 657–58. 
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polls.”72  “[S]uch perceptions,” the Court continued, must be rejected 
“as impermissible racial stereotypes.”73  Indeed, the Court explained 
that “racial bloc voting and minority-group political cohesion never 
can be assumed . . . .”74  The Court made clear that “the individual is 
important, not his race, his creed, or his color.”75 
Two years later, the Court, in Miller v. Johnson, assessed the consti-
tutionality of a Georgia redistricting plan that would have created 
three majority-black voting districts.76  The Court struck down the 
plan, applying and reaffirming the rule announced in Shaw. 77  Ac-
cording to the Miller Court, “[w]hen the State assigns voters on the 
basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption 
that voters of a particular race, because of their race, ‘think alike, 
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls.’”78  Further, the Court noted, “Race-based assignments 
‘embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their 
race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citi-
zens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history 
and the Constitution.’”79  More directly, the Court explained that 
“[t]he idea is a simple one:  ‘At the heart of the Constitution’s guar-
antee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Govern-
ment must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a 
racial, religious, sexual or national class.”80  Shaw and Reno are exam-
ples of the Court’s recognition of the diversity of viewpoints within a 
race and thereby examples of the operation of a constitutional rule 
that rejects the notion that there are monolithic racial views, atti-
tudes, or behaviors.81 
Voting is not the only context in which this rule has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court.  In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court deter-
 
 72 Id. at 649. 
 73 Miller, 509 U.S. at 649. 
 74 Id. at 652.  But see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats:  The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. 
L. REV. 1413, 1468 (1991) (“The assumption that blacks, wherever they reside, tend to be 
politically cohesive is supported both anecdotally and empirically.”). 
 75 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 77 Id. at 913. 
 78 Id. at 911–12 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647). 
 79 Id. at 912 (citations omitted) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 80 Id. at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 602 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted). 
 81 See also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006) (“We do a 
disservice to . . . important goals by failing to account for the differences between people 
of the same race.”). 
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mined that a defendant could object on equal protection grounds to 
a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, where the challenges 
excluded potential jurors of the same race as the defendant.82  The 
Court held that the prosecutor could not, consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause, categorically assume that jurors would be sympa-
thetic to a defendant of the same race:  “[The] Equal Protection 
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a 
group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a 
black defendant.”83  Moreover, the Court said, it “prohibits a State 
from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereo-
types . . . .”84  The Court clarified that attorneys could “obtain possibly 
relevant information about prospective jurors,”85 but, quoting Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, the Court announced that “[a] person’s race simp-
ly ‘is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.’”86 
Whereas Batson concerned a situation in which the defendant 
(black) was the same race as the excluded jurors (black), the Court 
later took up the open question of whether the Equal Protection 
Clause permits a defendant (white) to use peremptories to exclude 
jurors of a different race (black).87  The Court held that “the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State’s per-
emptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased per-
sons from the petit jury solely by reason of their race . . . .”88  In doing 
so, the Court emphasized that an individual of a given race cannot be 
deemed categorically unable to serve on a jury:  “[r]ace cannot be a 
proxy for determining juror bias or competence.”89  Again, “where 
racial bias is likely to influence a jury, an inquiry must be made into 
 
 82 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 104. 
 85 Id. at 89 n.12. 
 86 Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing)); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990) (noting that a prosecutor’s 
“assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black” 
violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 87 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id.; see also Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson Verdict:  A Lesson in Black and White, 1 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 69, 80 (1996) (“The view that Black jurors vote for Black defendants regardless 
of the evidence assumes that a monolith of values exists among Blacks based on a shared 
demographic feature, such as race, and ignores a wide diversity among Blacks on the 
same list of issues which diversifies Whites, including political, social, and economic sta-
tus.”). 
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such bias,” rather than presumed solely because of the racial identity 
of the prospective juror.90 
Such negative presumptions, regretfully replete in American his-
tory,91  are no longer tolerated.  In the words of the Supreme Court, 
they “force[] individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that of-
ten bear no relationship to their actual abilities” and they “deprive[] 
persons of their individual dignity . . . .”92  The presumptions brand 
members of a race with blanket attributes, reduce the individual to an 
undifferentiated part of a racial whole, consider the individual fungi-
ble, and fail to honor the autonomy and distinctiveness of the indi-
vidual.93 
Perhaps the most pernicious example of a rule prohibiting the at-
tachment of a stereotypical meaning on racial identity, ironically, is 
when the Court fell woefully short of honoring it.94 
 
 90 Powers, 499 U.S. at 415. 
 91 For example, as to African Americans, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 
(1857) (“[African Americans] had been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and al-
together unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and 
so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect . . . .”); 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, vol. 1 ch. XVIII (1835) (“[T]he Euro-
pean is to the other races of mankind what man himself is to the lower animals:  he 
makes them subservient to his use, and when he cannot subdue he destroys them.  Op-
pression has, at one stroke, deprived the descendants of the Africans of almost all the 
privileges of humanity.”).  As to Native Americans, see United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 
28, 39 (1913) (“Always living in separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive 
modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetishism, and chiefly governed ac-
cording to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, [Native Americans] are es-
sentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.”); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 
525 (1877) (stating that Native Americans belong to “an ignorant and dependent race”).  
As to Asian Americans, see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898) 
(Fuller, J., dissenting) (opining that Chinese Americans belong to “a distinct race and re-
ligion, remaining strangers in our land,” claiming that they were “unfamiliar with our in-
stitutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people”); People v. Hall, 4 
Cal. 399, 404–05 (Cal. 1854) (describing the Chinese as “a distinct people . . . whose 
mendacity is proverbial; a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who 
are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their his-
tory has shown . . . [and] between whom and ourselves nature has placed an impassable 
difference”). 
 92 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984). 
 93 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“To whatever racial 
group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and 
respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of 
public decisionmaking.”) (plurality opinion).  Justice William Brennan, for example, said, 
“[G]overnment may not, on account of race, insult or demean a human being by stereo-
typing his or her capacities, integrity, or worth as an individual.”  MARK TUSHNET, MAKING 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at 
126 (1997) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 See generally Stephen G. Breyer, Address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York:  Liberty, Security, and the Courts (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.
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In Korematsu v. United States, the Court was asked to review the 
constitutionality of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s infamous 
executive order authorizing the removal of “all individuals of Japa-
nese ancestry” from certain western areas of the nation.95  The Court 
dismissed the suggestion that the order was grounded in blanket ra-
cial animus against the Japanese, holding instead that the order was 
based on the pressing military reality that the United States was “at 
war with the Japanese Empire.”96  Similarly, shortly before Korematsu, 
the Court in Hirabayashi v. United States upheld the conviction of an 
American citizen of Japanese ancestry for violating curfew require-
ments imposed on individuals of Japanese descent in those same 
western regions.97  In doing so, the Court observed, “We cannot close 
our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of war 
residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a 
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry.”98 
The dissenting Justices in Korematsu did not buy the argument that 
the internment of over 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry could 
be constitutionally sanitized by military realities.  They expressed 
doubt that the government could append categorical concerns to an 
entire race of individuals without particularized evidence of individu-
al wrongdoing.  In his dissent, Justice Robert Jackson declared that “if 
any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is 
personal and not inheritable.”99  Justice Frank Murphy, in his dissent, 
observed that the “forced exclusion was the result in good measure of 
this erroneous assumption of racial guilt, rather than bona fide mili-
tary necessity.”100  As proof, Justice Murphy pointed to a military re-
port which categorized “all individuals of Japanese descent as ‘subver-
sive,’ as belonging to ‘an enemy race . . . .”101 
Korematsu and Hirabayashi may be contrasted with Ex Parte Mitsuye 
Endo, in which an individual of Japanese ancestry filed a writ of habe-
as corpus, seeking to be released from an internment camp located in 
California.102  As the government conceded that Endo was “a loyal 
 
supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html (describing Korematsu as a “de-
cision we now recognize as shameful” and observing that “Korematsu now represents the 
kind of constitutional decision that courts should seek to avoid”). 
 95 323 U.S. 214, 216–17 (1944). 
 96 Id. at 223. 
 97 320 U.S. 81, 86 (1943). 
 98 Id. at 101. 
 99 323 U.S. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 235–36 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
101 Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
102 323 U.S. 283, 284–85 (1942). 
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and law-abiding citizen,”103 the Court ordered that Endo be re-
leased.104  Rather than making decisions upon individual circum-
stances, as in Endo, or otherwise presume innocence in the absence of 
any evidence to the contrary, the government in Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi presumed disloyalty and subversive tendencies of mem-
bers of an entire community.  Korematsu and Hirabayashi serve as dis-
tressing examples of the dangers of using race as a proxy for negative 
characteristics. 
In short, the Court has stated that, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, it is impermissible to hold that individuals of the same race 
think or act alike, or that race can be used as a proxy for certain ide-
as, attitudes, or experiences.105  Qualities or traits instead must be de-
termined on an individual basis.  In the words of Ralph Richard 
Banks, “[T]reat[ing] individuals on the basis of group generalizations 
that might not apply to any particular individual, perhaps represents 
the paradigmatic harm that antidiscrimination law, including [the] 
Equal Protection Clause, is thought to guard against.”106 
In our hypothetical, the school does precisely this by presuming 
the African-American candidate’s ability to generate trust and coop-
eration solely on the basis of racial identity and without regard to in-
dividual traits.  The “external legitimacy” rationale embodies such a 
racial presumption and thus cannot be squared with a rule that for-
bids a state actor from attaching a monolithic meaning on a given 
race.107 
 
103 Id. at 294. 
104 Id. at 297. 
105 See Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 
2060 (1996) (“A huge chunk of equal protection law (and antidiscrimination law more 
generally) is aimed precisely at barring the use of reasonable, unbigoted judgments that 
race is a valid proxy for experiences, outlooks, or ideas.”); id. at 2062 (“One of the great 
tasks of antidiscrimination law over the past thirty years has been to persuade people that 
they ought not use race and sex as proxies, even when race and sex are statistically plausi-
ble proxies.”). 
106 R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doc-
trine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1091–92 (2001). 
107 A thoughtful commentator asks whether an individual who benefits from the positive ra-
cial presumptions may effectively “waive” any constitutional objections to the application 
of the “external legitimacy” to his or her circumstances.  To this, it may be answered that 
such a waiver was not contemplated by the Court in any of its seminal decisions relating 
to race-based presumptions.  For example, a Japanese-American citizen’s acquiescence to 
forced exclusion or an African American’s willingness to go along with segregation with-
out raising a fuss does not change the problematic constitutional nature of the underly-
ing actions.  Moreover, and in any case, there are other harms that extend beyond the 
advantaged race which cut against the “external legitimacy” doctrine, even if the concerns 
associated with the beneficiary of the presumptions are neutralized. 
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In addition, social norms reinforce the problematic nature of pre-
suming that individuals of a particular race possess certain desired 
qualities.  In The Office, a popular, recently completed depiction of an 
ordinary workplace, the manager, Michael Scott, characteristically 
crosses social boundaries and his breaches include various presump-
tions tied to race.108  For example, Scott presumes that Stanley Hud-
son, an African-American salesman, is good at basketball109 and has an 
“urban vibe.”110  Scott presumes that Darryl Philbin, an African-
American foreman-turned-executive, is familiar with rap music,111 and 
has experience with gangs.112  Further, Scott presumes Oscar Mar-
tinez, an Mexican-American accountant, will bring his “famous His-
panic cleaning ethic” to the office’s spring cleaning efforts,113 and 
Scott presumes that Kelly Kapoor, an Indian-American customer rela-
tions representative, knows the origins of a Hindu religious holiday.114 
It is precisely because of the audience’s understanding of prevailing 
social norms governing race that Scott’s lack of self-awareness as to 
racial matters is so evident and discomforting. 
More recently and back in the realm of real world situations, an 
Asian American wrote an essay on his own experiences with identity-
based presumptions.  The author acknowledged that he initially 
struggled as a computer programmer, but that he was given the bene-
fit of the doubt because he had the “privilege of implicit endorse-
ment.”115  This slack was based on the presumption that he was capa-
ble at programming because, as an Asian American, he “fit society’s 
image of a young programmer.”116 
These social examples demonstrate the problematic nature of 
presuming, without an inquiry into the actual qualities of the individ-
ual, that a member of a given race has certain favorable or desired 
qualities.  These social norms therefore support the constitutional 
 
108 See Bill Chappell & Carolyn Beeler, Should ‘The Office’ Be Used In HR Training?, NPR (Jan. 
14, 2010, 6:15 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122494690 
(suggesting that, because of the offensive comments made in the series, “The Office can be 
seen as a primer for everything you shouldn’t do at work”). 
109 The Office:  Basketball (NBC television broadcast Apr. 19, 2005). 
110 The Office:  Local Ad (NBC television broadcast Oct. 25, 2007). 
111 Id. 
112 The Office:  Did I Stutter? (NBC television broadcast May 1, 2008). 
113 The Office:  The Secret (NBC television broadcast Jan. 19, 2006). 
114 The Office:  Diwali (NBC television broadcast Nov. 2, 2006). 
115 Philip Guo, Silent Technical Privilege, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2014/01/programmer_privilege
_as_an_asian_male_computer_science_major_everyone_gave.single.html. 
116 Id. 
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rule that a monolithic understanding of racial identity has no place in 
our legal system or society. 
2.  The Performance Problem 
Another problem with the hypothetical situation offered is that 
the school will not only presume that the African-American teacher 
possesses the desired traits, as described above in Part II.A.1, but will 
effectively demand that the employee activate those traits in order to 
achieve the outcome sought by the employer.  In other words, the Af-
rican-American teacher will be expected to act according to the set of 
characteristics presumed to be held by the employee.  Indeed, an 
employer may hire an individual not because of his or her qualities 
alone, but because of how those qualities manifest themselves for the 
benefit of the employer.  In other words, the employee will be ex-
pected to “perform.”117  Contemporary understandings of race indi-
cate that racial performance is a tangible phenomenon and identifia-
ble harm in law and society. 
In academic literature, “performance” refers to the extent to 
which an individual conforms to social expectations tied to the indi-
vidual’s race.  These social expectations relate to both an individual’s 
thoughts and ideologies, and to the individual’s behavior or appear-
ance.  If an individual aligns with such expectations to a satisfactory 
extent, he or she attains credibility commensurate with the degree of 
conformance.  By contrast, an individual who fails to conform may be 
deemed to be not truly or genuinely part of the analyzed racial cate-
gory.118 
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, perhaps the most preeminent 
legal scholars on the subject of performance,119 explain that these ex-
ternal expectations impose pressure on the individual to “work” his 
 
117 See, e.g., Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 472 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying sum-
mary judgment in a Title VII case, in which a Chinese employee was expected to live up 
to expectations, in the words of the employer, that “Chinese work very hard, and for a 
long time, and the people who really produce results are these Chinese people”). 
118 See Catherine E. Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 
55, 79 (2006) (“[R]acial identification arms identifiers with a unique ‘constellation of 
manifestations’ that exacerbate in-group favoritism and out-group derision.”). 
119 Their scholarship on performance includes:  Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversa-
tions at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 (2000); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at 
Work:  Remembering David Charny, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 13 (2001); Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 
(2003) (reviewing FRANCISCO VALDES ET AL., CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)). 
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or her racial identity:  to maximize behavior that lines up with the ex-
ternal expectations and to minimize or downplay conduct that does 
not accord with the external expectations.120  (The latter practice of 
hiding elements of racial identity that may be less palatable to others 
is what Kenji Yoshino has coined “covering.”)121  An individual, in 
other words, is not free to act but is compelled to respond to external 
expectations about how an individual of his or her race should be-
have.  Those restraints, and the commensurate adjustments, are prob-
lematic in that they are the product of presumptions of standard ra-
cial thought or action and inhibit the ability of the individual to think 
or act according to the dictates of individual conscience.122  
Expectations of performance abound in contemporary American 
society.  This is perhaps no more evident than in persistent conversa-
tions about the “blackness” of President Barack Obama.  President 
Obama’s emergence on the political stage and ascendance to the 
presidency were accompanied by charges that he was “too black” or 
not “black enough.”123  For example, one commentator declared, 
“when black Americans refer to Obama as ‘one of us,’ I do not know 
what they are talking about,” suggesting that President Obama has 
not “lived the life of a black American.”124 
The challenge to President Obama’s racial identity is but one re-
cent example of a long line of such inquiries as to the sufficiency of 
racial performance of public figures.  These examples follow charges 
that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas,125 former Secre-
 
120 Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White?  Re-thinking Race in Post-Racial America 1–
16 (2013). 
121 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002) (explaining that covering oc-
curs when someone downplays underlying parts of their identity). 
122 It is true that society may shape or at least inform individual thought and action such that 
it would not be realistic to conceive of the individual as an abstract organism entirely in-
dependent of social influences.  But where those influences are tied to race, a social con-
struct, and suspect and highly dangerous trait that is irrelevant to the individual’s abili-
ties, those particular restraints are of a different, and problematic nature. 
123 See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Is Obama Black Enough?, TIME, Feb. 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1584736,00.html; Rachel L. Swarns, 
‘African-American’ Becomes A Term for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/us/african-american-becomes-a-term-for-debate.
html. 
124 Stanley Crouch, What Obama Isn’t:  Black Like Me, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2006, available 
at http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/opinions/obama-isn-black-race-article-
1.585922. 
125 See DINESH D’SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM:  PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 479 
(1996) (listing criticisms of the Justice Thomas’s blackness, including the view that he has 
“ceased to be an African American”). 
1360 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
tary of State Colin Powell,126 and former Secretary of State Con-
doleezza Rice,127 to name just a few, fell short of social expectations of 
“blackness.” 
Such demands of racial authenticity are not exclusive to African 
Americans.  Mitt Romney128 and Rudolph Giuliani129 encountered 
views that they are not “white enough,” Ted Cruz130 and Miguel Estra-
da131 that they are not “Hispanic enough,”132 and Elizabeth Warren 
that she is not “Native enough.”133  Biracial individuals stand at the 
crossroads of these expectations, being, for example, neither “black 
enough” nor “white enough” at the same time.134  Notions of racial 
performance are found in elements of popular culture.  In contem-
porary modern culture, perhaps no character was weighed by expec-
tations of racial performance more than Carlton Banks—the affluent, 
well-educated, well-dressed, and articulate, Tom Jones-loving Repub-
 
126 See Chris Cillizza, Colin Powell’s (Overlooked) Call to Action on Race, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 
2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/14/colin-
powells-overlooked-call-to-action-on-race; see also Condoleezza Rice is a House Negro, SUEDE 
(2005), reprinted in TOURÉ, NEVER DRANK THE KOOL-AID: ESSAYS 317 (2007). 
127 See id. 
128 See Alex Pareene, Romney:  Not White Enough?, SALON (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/11/09/weekly_standard_republicans_must_play_white_ide
ntity_politics_better_next_time/. 
129 See Terry Moran, Is Giuliani “White” Enough?, ABC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2007, 4:15 PM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/02/is_giuliani_whi. 
130 See Aaron Blake, Bill Richardson:  Ted Cruz Should Not ‘Be Defined as a Hispanic,’ WASH. 
POST, May 6, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2013/05/06/bill-richardson-ted-cruz-should-not-be-defined-as-a-hispanic/. 
131 See 149 CONG. REC. S2085 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2003) (citing Byron York, Dems to Miguel Es-
trada:  You’re not Hispanic Enough, NAT’L REV., Feb. 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205824/dems-miguel-estrada-youre-not-
hispanic-enough/byron-york). 
132 Though “Hispanic” describes an ethnicity, I treat it, as other scholars have, as a race for 
purposes of this Article.  See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimina-
tion, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469, 470 n.2 (2010) (adopting a “functional definition” of Lati-
no/Latina as a race). 
133 See Stephanie Siek, Who’s a Native American?  It’s Complicated, CNN (May 14, 2012), 
http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/14/whos-a-native-american-its-
complicated/comment-page-1 (discussing the cultural and ancestral components of Na-
tive American tribal citizenship). 
134 See KATHLEEN ODELL KORGEN, FROM BLACK TO BIRACIAL:  TRANSFORMING RACIAL IDENTITY 
AMONG AMERICANS 63 (1998) (“There are hardships . . . that are unique to biracial indi-
viduals.  They may experience a sense of isolation, feeling ‘not quite black enough’ when 
around black people and ‘not quite white enough’ when around white individuals.  In 
turn, both blacks and whites may encourage this sense of isolation by either declaring 
outright or implying that biracial people are not white or black enough.”).  
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lican from the popular, now off-air Fresh Prince of Bel-Air television se-
ries.135 
In our running hypothetical, the school has hired an African 
American on the premise that the African American has the neces-
sary qualities that will produce trust and cooperation amongst par-
ents (the issue of monolithic racial meaning described in Part II.A.1).  
Moreover, the employer expects the African-American employee, 
once hired, to demonstrate those traits, such that trust and coopera-
tion can flourish in actuality.  The African-American employee thus 
has external pressure to act in accordance with those expectations 
and exhibit the desired traits, even if the individual himself or herself 
does not have, or is not inclined to express, those traits.  The employ-
ee, furthermore, may face adverse consequences if he or she does not 
conduct himself or herself in the manner that comports with the em-
ployer’s expectations. 
In general, it is the expectation of conduct based on race that 
gives rise to a cognizable issue under the “performance” rationale.  
To be clear, the problematic nature of the performance described 
here does not change because the expectation here is “positive,” 
which is to say the employer expects the employee to act in a prized 
manner advantageous to the employer.  The impermissible aspects of 
race-based performance are with the expectation of action, the pres-
sure to so act, and the tangible consequences that lie above the head 
of the employee should he or she deviate from those expectations. 
3.  The Negative Presumption Problem 
To recap thus far, the school officials’ employment action is prob-
lematic because it presumes that African Americans categorically pos-
sess a desired trait due to race, without regard to the individual quali-
ties or abilities of the candidate (Part. II.A.1) and expects the African-
 
135 Throughout the run of The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air, Carlton’s blackness was front and center.  
Will Smith, the protagonist of the series, poked fun at Carlton’s blackness, quipping, for 
example, “Roses are red, violets are blue, Jazz and I are black, but Carlton, what are you?”  
The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air:  Def Poet’s Society (NBC television broadcast Oct. 22, 1990).  In 
one particularly serious episode, Carlton pledged a black fraternity, only to be rejected 
because a frat elder did not want to include someone characterized by “Ralph Lauren 
shirts, wing-tipped shoes, and corporate America,” declaring finally that he would not 
admit a “sell-out” into his fraternity.  The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air:  Blood is Thicker than Mud 
(NBC television broadcast Nov. 1, 1993).  Carlton responded, “Being black isn’t what I’m 
trying to be, it’s what I am.”  Id.  The episode offered the poignant observation that an 
individual need not perform in a certain or specified way in order to be an accepted or 
authentic member of a racial group. 
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American employee, once hired and because of race, to perform the 
presumed trait (Part II.A.2).  What of the Asian-American applicant? 
The school officials are seeking a second-grade teacher that, 
among other things, will be able to produce trust and cooperation 
from a predominantly African-American parent population.  Further, 
as noted in Part II.A.1, the employer presumes that an African-
American candidate, solely because of this candidate’s race, has the 
coveted trait that will be able to generate such trust and cooperation 
from the parents.  Necessarily, the employer presumes that the Asian-
American applicant, again solely on the basis of race, does not have 
the trait that may enhance trust or cooperation from the African-
American parents. 
The problem with presuming that the Asian American does not 
have certain favored qualities is the same as with the presumption 
that the African American does:  the presumption that certain traits 
categorically follow racial identity—that person of race x reliably has 
characteristic y, or that person of race z reliably does not have charac-
teristic y, without regard to the particulars of the person and relying 
solely on racial identity to make these twin judgments.  As explained 
in Part II.A.1, these viewpoints are inconsistent with a constitutional 
principle that monolithic qualities cannot be presumed on the basis 
of race.  Part II.A.3 indicates that when this principle is violated, the 
violation is double:  members of a given race are deemed to possess a 
sought-after quality, and, simultaneously, the decisionmaker pre-
sumes that individuals of other races do not possess that same desired 
quality. 
4.  The Equal Consideration Problem 
There are tangible consequences from the operation of these dual 
presumptions.  In particular, an individual presumed, on the basis of 
race, to possess a valued characteristic (as noted in Part II.A.1) will be 
favored in hiring.  Individuals who are presumed, on the basis of 
race, to not possess a desired trait (as noted in Part II.A.3) are at a 
disadvantage in the hiring process.  In our hypothetical, the Asian-
American applicant, who may have the qualities that are preferred by 
the school and that may give rise to a strengthened relationship be-
tween the school and the parents, is denied equal consideration for 
the position and may be excluded from the employment opportunity.  
This effect cannot be squared with the Constitution. 
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“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all 
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”136  But this guiding 
principle that similarly situated individuals be treated the same is not 
absolute.  Indeed, there are circumstances under which a state actor 
may treat similarly situated individuals differently in a manner con-
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause.137  The question becomes 
whether the denial of equal opportunity to an individual who is pre-
sumed not to possess a coveted characteristic—the Asian-American 
applicant in our hypothetical—falls within one of those circumstanc-
es and thus is valid for constitutional purposes. 
When the different treatment is premised on race, courts require 
that the state actor advance a “compelling” justification for the differ-
ential treatment and show that the means chosen are “narrowly tai-
lored” in service of the compelling end.138  The Supreme Court has 
identified a limited set of reasons that are sufficiently “compelling” to 
justify race-based differential treatment.  First, the Court has held that 
an institution of higher education may take race into account in ad-
missions in order to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse stu-
dent body.139  Second, whereas colleges and universities may engage 
in this form of forward-looking race-conscious admissions, the Court 
has held that a state employer may only use race in hiring for back-
ward-looking reasons; that is, to remedy past discrimination for which 
it is responsible.140  Third, the Court has deferred to national security 
 
136 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
137 See Enguist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (“When those who appear sim-
ilarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at 
least a rational reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to legislation 
or regulation are indeed being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
138 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifi-
cations, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.”). 
139 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that universities can take race 
into account when making admissions decisions where the “narrowly tailored use of race” 
is “to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits” of a diverse stu-
dent body). 
140 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989) (holding that a city 
cannot take race into account when making procurement decisions without identifying 
past discrimination that is in need of remediation).  The Equal Protection Clause applies 
only to governmental actors.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to all em-
ployers, public or private, with at least fifteen employees.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).  Title VII 
is read to be narrower and stricter than the Equal Protection Clause.  See Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6 (1987) (noting that Congress in-
tended Title VII principles to apply to both governmental and private employers).  Ac-
cordingly, private employers as compared to public employers enjoy no more opportuni-
ty, other than this single remedial exception, to use race in its decisionmaking. 
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exigencies and permitted the government to consider race in the ex-
ecution of wartime policies, such as the curfew imposed on and in-
ternment of individuals of Japanese ancestry.141 
It is worth noting that five Justices of the Supreme Court would 
have found a fourth compelling justification for racial discrimination:  
public school districts’ use of race-conscious assignments as a re-
sponse to racial imbalances in the districts’ schools, where the dis-
tricts’ use of race would be voluntary, that is to say not directed by a 
court-ordered desegregation decree.142  As these five Justices’ views 
were not part of the holding of the Court, this particular justification 
for race-based discrimination is not the law of the land.143 
On the other side of the coin, the Court has explicitly rejected a 
“role model” rationale as a constitutional justification for a racial clas-
sification.  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a school board ar-
gued, in defense of its race-conscious employment policies, that it 
had a compelling state interest “in providing minority role models for 
its minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the effects of societal 
discrimination race . . . .”144  The Court ruled, however, that this justi-
fication could only support a racial classification if the school board’s 
policies were designed to remedy “particularized findings” of the 
school board’s prior racial discrimination.145  
The three available reasons to treat individuals differently on the 
basis of race—race-conscious admissions in higher education, race-
conscious remedies in employment for past discrimination for which 
 
141 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943).  It should be added that in Johnson v. California,, the Court held 
that strict scrutiny was the proper standard that governed the use of race by penal institu-
tions.  543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005).  The Court did not rule, on the merits, that the use of 
race in the penal context constituted a compelling state interest.  Id. at 515. 
142 See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A compelling inter-
est exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and 
expertise, may choose to pursue.”); id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting, with the 
support of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, that the Court has “approved of ‘nar-
rowly tailored’ plans that are no less race conscious” than the one at hand). 
143 Justice Anthony Kennedy, who concurred in part and concurred in the judgment of the 
Court, thus giving the Court a majority for purposes of striking down the assignment 
plans on narrow tailoring grounds, would have held, along with the dissenting justices 
that public school districts possess a compelling state interest in eliminating de facto ra-
cial isolation.  Id. at 797. 
144 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
145 Id. at 276; id. at 274 (“This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is suf-
ficient to justify a racial classification.  Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing 
of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of 
racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination.”).  Whether the “external 
legitimacy” rationale survives post-Wygant is highly debatable. 
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the employer is responsible, and race-conscious national security 
practices146—do not encompass the race-based different treatment 
contemplated by the “external legitimacy” doctrine, which is a for-
ward-looking enterprise that is attractive for the benefits it may 
achieve among an external constituency and is not a backward-
looking remedial response to a state actor’s own past racial discrimi-
nation.147  Accordingly, without needing to proceed to the narrowly-
tailored prong of the equal protection analysis, it appears that the 
“external legitimacy” doctrine cannot be reconciled with prevailing 
constitutional jurisprudence.148  The denial of equal consideration of 
the hypothetical Asian-American candidate, therefore, would be a 
cognizable constitutional problem.149 
 
146 Leading constitutional scholars agree that there are only three such acceptable depar-
tures from the constitutional ban on the use of race by state actors.  See, e.g., MICHAEL 
STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1403 (2d ed., 2013) 
(enumerating the same three compelling state interests). 
147 See Hershell Gill Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317 
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in higher education 
affirmative action does not modify the Court’s rulings on racial classifications in employ-
ment). 
148 Indeed, courts blessing the “external legitimacy” doctrine have seemingly applied an odd 
form of strict scrutiny that arguably does not conform to this exacting, searching review.  
See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (asking whether the government’s 
operational needs argument is “motivated by a truly powerful and worthy concern” and 
whether “the racial measure that they have adopted is a plainly apt response to that con-
cern”).  The Court has insisted that strict scrutiny be applied correctly.  See Fisher v. Univ. 
of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (remanding the case because the circuit 
court improperly deferred to state university on narrowly tailoring prong of the strict 
scrutiny analysis). 
149 It would present a statutory problem as well.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of race in employment.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  An 
employment action predicated on the notion that only members of one race shall be giv-
en special consideration amounts to a view that the racial identity of the applicant or em-
ployee is a “bona fide occupational qualification,” or BFOQ.  Id. § 2000e-2(e).  Title VII 
permits an employer to treat individuals differently on account of a protected trait if the 
trait “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise . . . .”  Id.  That said, race is not among the 
traits which Title VII recognizes under the BFOQ exception to discrimination, thus ex-
cluding by implication race as a valid BFOQ in employment.  See id.  Accordingly, an em-
ployer may not use race as a BFOQ as a shield from general statutory prohibitions on 
employment discrimination.  At most, race in employment can be used only in truly ex-
traordinary circumstances.  See, e.g., JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE 
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 173–74 (5th ed. 2001) (suggesting that race may 
be a BFOQ in the hiring of actors where physical appearance is critical to the role). 
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5.  The Race Defining Problem 
The external legitimacy doctrine not only presumes that individu-
als of a given race possess certain desired characteristics (Part II.A.1) 
and presumes that individuals of other races do not possess those 
same desired characteristics (Part II.A.3), but also affixes a particular 
(not just monolithic) meaning on the individuals’ races, thus with-
drawing from these individuals the ability to determine what their 
race means for external purposes.  In other words, the “external legit-
imacy” doctrine bestows on the decision maker, such as the employer, 
the power to ascertain the substantive contents of a particular racial 
identity.150 
In our hypothetical, the employer is able to presume, simply on 
the basis of racial identity, that an African-American candidate is able 
to produce affection among African-American parents and that an 
Asian-American candidate is unable to generate that similar relation-
ship.  In other words, the employer is categorically assuming from the 
race of the applicant that an individual has or does not have a per-
sonal attribute, without the applicant having done or said anything in 
reference to or support of that link.  The employer instead has relied 
on the actual or perceived racial identity of the applicant to make a 
determination and in that sense has attached a specific meaning to 
the applicant’s race.151 
Yet, it should be the candidate who should define not only what 
race he or she wishes to be affiliated with, but also what it means to 
be a member of that identified race.152  For example, an employer 
may presume that, ‘Because an applicant is race x, he or she possesses 
 
150 The Court in Grutter said, “Just as growing up in a particular region or having particular 
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, 
unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race un-
fortunately still matters.”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).  While this may 
be true, it should be the province of the individual to determine whether and how it mat-
ters inasmuch as he or she is being evaluated by others.  The individual may articulate 
some or all of those “unique experiences,” or may make a conscious decision to mark 
some or all of those experiences as private and “off-limits” for external knowledge or con-
sideration. 
151 Indeed, the employer has not only reduced the applicant’s race to a singular interest in 
ascertaining whether a desired trait is present, but in doing so has commodified that ra-
cial identity.  This “instrumental” use of race, Nancy Leong points out, “is antithetical to a 
view of . . . race . . . as a personal characteristic intrinsically deserving of respect.”  Leong, 
supra note 15, at 2155. 
152 Even if racial identity is not developed in a vacuum, and instead is developed in relation 
to external realities, this Part addresses itself to the dangers of imposing meaning of racial 
identity on an individual and to limiting that undue outside influence on identity for-
mation. 
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trait y,’ and that ‘Because an applicant is race z, he or she does not 
possess trait y.’  The possession or non-possession of y should be for 
the applicant to demonstrate, rather than be categorically presumed 
on account of his or her racial identity.153  More specifically, the Afri-
can-American candidate should be able to make plain that he or she 
has the interest in and abilities to provoke trust and cooperation 
among parents, and the Asian American should be able to make that 
same showing as well—on equal terms as other applicants, that is 
without the benefit or hindrance of any constructions of, or pre-
sumptions tied to, racial identity. 
In the modern day, it is improper to impose a fixed, particular 
meaning on the racial identity of another.  This contemporary prin-
ciple is best illustrated, as with Korematsu and Hirabiyashi in Part II.A, 
by reference to historical cases in which the principle was flouted. 
In Plessy v. Ferguson,154 the Supreme Court in 1896 reviewed the 
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that required “‘all railway 
companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this State’” to 
“‘provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and col-
ored races,’” and that prohibited any individual from “‘occupy[ing] 
seats in coaches, other than, the ones, assigned, to them on account 
of the race they belong to.’”155  Homer Plessy sought to occupy the 
coach designated for white passengers,156 but was “required by the 
conductor . . . to vacate said coach and occupy another seat in a 
coach assigned . . . for persons not of the white race . . . .”157  Plessy as-
serted that “he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity se-
cured to citizens of the United States of the white race”158 because he 
 
153 In the admissions context, the ability of colleges and universities to make judgments 
about whether an applicant has valuable viewpoints on the basis of racial self-
identification alone and not the record perhaps helps explain Chief Justice John Rob-
erts’s questions at oral argument in the Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin case, in which 
he referred repeatedly to the fact that racial self-identification is on the front of an indi-
vidual’s application for admission to the University of Texas.  See Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 32, 33, 36, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11–
345) (questioning by Chief Justice Roberts concerning an applicant’s checking of a box 
to identify with a particular race); id. at 54 (asking “whether race is the only . . . holistic 
factors that appears on the cover of every application”); see also id. at 35 (questioning by 
Justice Antonin Scalia on the same topic); id. at 52 (exchange with Justice Alito on the 
same topic). 
154 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
155 Id. at 540 (citations omitted). 
156 Id. at 538. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 541. 
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was “seven[-]eighths Caucasian and one[-]eighth African blood”159 
and “the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him . . . .”160 
The Court disagreed.  First, the Court held that Plessy’s racial 
identity was for Louisiana to decide:  Whether a person is white or 
black, the Court claimed, is “to be determined under the laws of each 
[s]tate,” and that whether Plessy in particular “belongs to the white or 
colored race” is a matter reserved for Louisiana.161  Second, the Court 
held that the segregation of the railcars on the basis of race does not 
offend the Equal Protection Clause.162 
Plessy warrants criticism for many reasons.  Most relevant here, the 
Court removed from Plessy the ability to define his racial identity 
(white or black) and the meaning of that identity for external pur-
poses (fit or unfit for sitting in particular railcars), and placed such 
definitional and interpretive responsibilities in the hands of the State.  
As Jonathan Kahn observes, the Court “depriv[ed] Plessy of control 
over his own racial self-definition and subject[ed] him to forced sepa-
ration based on that definition.”163 “Thus,” Professor Kahn adds, 
“Plessy was not just about segregating people based upon their racial 
identity, it was also about establishing a legal framework for allocating 
power to determine racial identity.”164  In short, Plessy imposed a state-
determined racial identity on Plessy, and exposed him to adverse 
consequences as a result of that imposed racial identity. 
In United States v. Thind,165 the Supreme Court in 1923 explored 
whether Bhagat Singh Thind—who was described as a person “of 
high caste Hindu stock, born in . . . India, and classified by certain 
scientific authorities as of the Caucasian or Aryan race”166—was 
white.167  This question was of significance because, under the federal 
immigration framework in place at the time, naturalization extended 
 
159 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 552. 
162 Id. at 550–51; see also Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 257 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the “ugly legacy” 
of Plessy, specifically its holding that racially segregated schools may be equal under the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
163 Jonathan Kahn, Controlling Identity:  Plessy, Privacy, and Racial Defamation, 54 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 755, 758 (2005). 
164 Id. at 765; see also Joshua Herman, Identifying Privacy:  An Introduction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 
657, 664 (2005) (observing that “identity was central to Plessy and by allowing the 
states . . . to determine who was white and who was black, the courts enabled the states to 
control identity by defining it and conditioning benefits on those determinations”). 
165 261 U.S. 204 (1923). 
166 Id. at 210. 
167 Id. at 206. 
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only to “aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African na-
tivity and to persons of African descent.”168  Thind did not claim to be 
African, as he was born in India.169  Accordingly, the Court noted 
quite simply, “If the applicant is a white person . . . [,] he is entitled 
to naturalization; otherwise not.”170 
In ascertaining whether Thind was white, the Court relied on the 
“common” or “popular” usage of the term “white” because, in the 
words of the Court, it is this meaning, not any scientific or formal in-
terpretation, that “was within the contemplation of the framers of the 
statute or of the people for whom it was framed.”171  Conceding that 
this amounted to a “racial test,”172 the Court held that “white” was “in-
tended to include only the type of man whom [the framers of the 
statute] knew as white,”173 specifically immigrants primarily “from the 
British Isles and Northwestern Europe, whence they and their for-
bears had come.”174  The Court explained that it was not establishing 
any racial hierarchy, but merely acknowledging the “racial differ-
ence” between the whites and Indian Hindus that “the great body of 
our people instinctively recognize . . . .”175 
Thind and Ozawa v. United States, a similar case involving an indi-
vidual from Japan who sought naturalization,176 have been discredited 
because, in these cases, the Court defined (or allowed the state to de-
fine) the racial identity of an individual, withdrawing from the indi-
vidual that solemn and personal determination.177  “As Ozawa and 
Thind hinged on the matter of classification itself, they also provide a 
unique opportunity to observe the Court-as-institution participating 
 
168 30 U.S.C. § 2169 (1901) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 316, 
318). 
169 Thind, 261 U.S. at 206. 
170 Id. at 207. 
171 Id. at 209; see also id. (“The words of the statute are to be interpreted in accordance with 
the understanding of the common man from whose vocabulary they were taken.”). 
172 Id. 
173 Thind, 261 U.S. at 213. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 215. 
176 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (holding that a Japanese person is not Caucasian). 
177 See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving:  Uncovering the Federal Government’s Racial 
Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361, 1392 (2011) (“These cases did more than 
define who was Asian (rather than White) and thus ineligible for naturalization, however.  
They also reflected citizenship law’s power to construct and reify White domination and 
supremacy.”).  To be sure, in Thind the Court “defined ‘white’ through a process of nega-
tion, systematically identifying who was non-White.”  IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27 (1996); see Thind, 261 U.S. at 215 (holding that “a 
negative answer must be given to the . . . question” of whether Thind is white and there-
fore entitled to naturalization). 
1370 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
in the process of racial formation,” Donald Braman writes.178  In these 
cases, the individual is both denied the ability to define his racial 
identity and subject to adverse consequences as a result of the exter-
nally-dictated racial identity, namely the denial of naturalized citizen-
ship. 
Similarly, with respect to the “external legitimacy” doctrine, an 
employer commits these double fouls:  first, the employer dictates for 
a candidate the meaning of his or her racial identity (i.e., that he or 
she, because of his or her race, can or cannot trigger trust and coop-
eration); and second, the employer adds a tangible consequence to 
the imposed construction of the applicant’s racial identity by denying 
equal consideration for the position. 
B.  Social Costs 
1.  The Stereotype Entrenchment Problem 
The harms of the “external legitimacy” doctrine explored thus far 
concern the presumptions and operation of those presumptions as to 
the existence or non-existence of a desired trait. What if the individu-
al presumed to not have the particular trait does, in fact, have the 
trait?  In our hypothetical, what if the Asian-American applicant has 
the demonstrated interest in and ability to generate trust and coop-
eration among predominantly African-American parents?  For start-
ers, due to the presumption that Asian-Americans cannot generate 
trust or cooperation among African-American parents, the Asian-
American applicant may be unable to make that case at all, or at a 
minimum has more ground to cover in order to overcome the pre-
sumption. 
Moreover, and most relevant here, to the extent that the Asian 
American actually possesses, but is not afforded equal consideration 
and denied employment, the harms of the “external legitimacy” doc-
trine extend beyond the Asian-American applicant to the school offi-
cials, students, and parents.  In particular, the school officials, stu-
dents, and parents are deprived of the opportunity to understand 
and appreciate that a teacher of a different (and really any) race may 
exhibit the concern and talents that are coveted and that may pro-
duce the affection wanted by and helpful to the school officials. 
With the “external legitimacy” doctrine, the presumption that on-
ly individuals of the same race are going to care and be effective is re-
 
178 Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1401 (1999). 
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inforced and hardened.  At the same time, the knowledge that indi-
viduals of any race can serve the school’s needs and be successful 
partners with parents is lost on various constituents and the oppor-
tunity to break down racial stereotypes is missed.  Indeed, students, 
who arguably may be the greatest beneficiaries of this lesson,179 are 
not able to interact with, learn from, and be exposed to individuals of 
different races, where that contact can be helpful to the development 
and maturation of students in an increasingly diverse society and 
world.180 
As the Court has suggested, racial classifications, if used, must tear 
down, and not build up or strengthen, racial barriers to understand-
ing.181  Indeed, if the value of diversity is to facilitate cross-racial en-
gagement and awareness, it would stand to reason that a policy keep-
ing individuals of the same race together and individuals of different 
races apart would actively stifle the prospects for these social bene-
fits.182 
2.  The Role Exclusion Problem 
Social roles should be open to individuals of all races, without so-
cially-imposed racial barriers to entry.  For example, Doug Williams, 
the first African American to be the starting quarterback of a Super 
Bowl-winning team, where professional quarterbacks were generally 
white, recalled how he was discussed prior to his historic victory:  
 
179 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 865 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that, compared to higher education, “there is even 
more to gain,” with respect to racial diversity in public primary and secondary schools); 
id. at 840, 843 (commenting on the importance of “helping our children learn to work 
and play together with children of different racial backgrounds,” “teaching children to 
engage in the kind of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make 
a land of 300 million people one Nation,” and “help[ing] create citizens better prepared 
to know, to understand, and to work with people of all races and backgrounds”); id. at 
842 (“Primary and secondary schools are where the education of this Nation’s children 
begins, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us to the end of our 
days.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless 
our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to 
live together.”). 
180 See Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes:  Social Science Evidence, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 744–46, 745–46 nn.70–76 (1998) (summarizing social science evidence 
on the benefits of interracial interactions in the elementary and secondary school con-
text). 
181 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (acknowledging the importance of 
“cross-racial understanding,” breaking down racial stereotypes, and enabling students to 
better understand persons of different races). 
182 See id. at 331–32 (recognizing the importance of ensuring a diverse workforce and mili-
tary leadership). 
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“every article that was written, every adjective was ‘Tampa’s black 
quarterback’ or ‘black quarterback Doug Williams . . . .”183  Today, 
however, “you don’t read about [quarterbacks] being black.  They 
just happen to be their quarterback, and I think that’s the way it 
should be.”184  Williams’s reflections speak to a transition that he 
helped achieve and that should occur within each social role.  While 
progress has been made as to some roles, such advancements are not 
complete. 
Indeed, certain social roles remain the presumptive or exclusive 
province of members of particular races.  For example, basketball 
player Jeremy Lin faced questions about his basketball bona fides due 
to his Asian-American identity.185  As Williams suggests, Lin should be 
assessed on the basis of his basketball skills, without his skills being 
second-guessed on account of his identity.  Eminem, who is Cauca-
sian, has been seen as an “interloper” in the rap world.186  Similarly, 
American Idol contestant Gurpreet Singh Sarin, a turbaned Indian 
American, was called “turbanator” and “turb” during his first appear-
ance on the series.187  Sarin should have been evaluated on the basis 
of his singing ability and personality, without encountering com-
ments about his turban as a cost of competing.188  In short, certain 
public arenas or spheres of activity should not be seen as dominant or 
exclusive domains of particular races, and those of other races who 
 
183 Greg Garber, Doug Williams Embraces History, ESPN.COM (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2012/story/_/id/8884695/super-bowl-xlvii-doug-
williams-embraces-history. 
184 Id. 
185 See Touré, Jeremy Lin’s Triumph Over Stereotype Threat, TIME, Feb. 28, 2012, available at 
http://ideas.time.com/2012/02/28/jeremy-lins-triumph-over-stereotype-threat/ (noting 
Lin’s difficulty convincing NBA teams of his abilities due to “the societal script that does 
not expect Asian Americans to be pro-level basketball players”). 
186 Nekesa Mumbi Moody, Feud Between Eminem and The Source Magazine Wounds on Both Sides, 
ONLINE ATHENS (Feb. 7, 2004), http://onlineathens.com/stories/020704/
ent_20040207005.shtml#.VSH6tBPF9v4. 
187 See Gurpreet Singh Sarin American Idol Audition, YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://youtu.be/FzbBmjxPODc (dubbing Sarin the “turbanator” and discussing his tur-
ban). 
188 This aspiration is not limited to the racial context.  Michael Sam, the college football 
player who came out as homosexual prior to the National Football League draft, should 
be assessed by professional teams on the basis of his football acumen and abilities, not his 
sexual orientation.  See Jeff Legwold, John Elway Says He Applauds Michael Sam, ESPN.COM 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://espn.go.com/blog/denver-broncos/post/_/id/5041/john-elway-
says-he-applauds-michael-sam (quoting Elway as saying, “we will evaluate Michael just like 
any other draft prospect—on the basis of his ability, character and NFL potential. His an-
nouncement will have no effect on how we see him as a football player”).  Nor should it. 
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do not fit preconceived notions of proper inhabitants should not be 
seen as exotic trespassers.189 
The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence from the gender con-
text helps explain that social roles should be open irrespective of 
race.  Two cases are particularly instructive in this regard.  In Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan,190 the Court considered whether 
the Mississippi University for Women’s nursing school could deny 
admission to men and “limit[] its enrollment to women.”191  The uni-
versity argued that its admissions policy “compensates for discrimina-
tion against women . . . .”192 
The Court was unpersuaded.  The Court determined that the uni-
versity had failed to demonstrate that sufficient discriminatory condi-
tions existed to justify a single-sex admissions policy.193  More im-
portantly for our purposes, the Court held that the university’s 
purportedly benign justification for the admissions policy had the ef-
fect of entrenching archaic and stereotypical views of women and fe-
male roles:  “Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers 
faced by women,” the Court said, the university’s “policy of excluding 
males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate 
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job.”194  Ho-
gan stands for the proposition that even benign explanations for cat-
egorical gender-based classifications may not be sustainable if the 
classifications embody and entrench harmful stereotypes about the 
presumptive place of men or women in our society.  As racial classifi-
cations are subject to more demanding constitutional scrutiny as 
 
189 As a recent example, prior to the 2014 Winter Olympics, an African-American reporter 
for the Washington Post addressed how his interest in figure skating subverts stereotypical 
notions that African Americans are not fans of the sport.  See Robert Samuels, I’m Black.  
I’m a Guy.  And I’m Obsessed With Figure Skating, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-black-im-a-guy-and-im-obsessed-with-
figure-skating/2014/01/30/1ddfafae-8819-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html.  That the 
author felt it necessary to dispel the notion that African Americans do not like figure skat-
ing speaks to the stubborn, wrongful belief that certain activities are proper, or not prop-
er, for certain races. 
190 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
191 Id. at 720. 
192 Id. at 727. 
193 See id. at 729 (“Mississippi has made no showing that women lacked opportunities to ob-
tain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in that field when 
the [nursing school] opened its door or that women currently are deprived of such op-
portunities.”). 
194 Id. 
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compared to gender-based classifications,195 Hogan applies with great-
er force in the racial context. 
In United States v. Virginia, the Court appraised whether the Virgin-
ia Military Institute (“VMI”), a public undergraduate institution 
whose mission was to produce “citizen-soldiers,” could, consistent 
with the Equal Protection Clause, limit enrollment to males.196 Virgin-
ia explained that VMI needed to categorically exclude females be-
cause “the unique VMI method of character development and lead-
ership training, [referred to as] the school’s adversative approach, 
would have to be modified were VMI to admit women.”197 
The Court rejected the argument that “VMI’s adversative meth-
od. . . cannot be made available, unmodified, to women,”198 holding 
that Virginia could not “constitutionally deny to women who have the 
will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI 
uniquely affords.”199  The Court reasoned that even if “most women 
would not choose VMI’s adversative method,”200 Virginia could not 
categorically assume that no women would be unable or unwilling to 
satisfy VMI’s rigorous program designed for men and therefore ex-
clude all women from admission.  The Court pointed out, for exam-
ple, that women have successfully entered “federal military acade-
mies,” “participat[ed] in the Nation’s military forces,” and “graduated 
at the top of their class at every federal military academy.”201 
The Court emphasized that Virginia “may not exclude qualified 
individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities 
of males and females,’”202 or “rely on overbroad generalizations to 
make judgments about people that are likely to. . . perpetuate histori-
cal patterns of discrimination.”203  That is precisely what Virginia did, 
however.  The Court concluded that Virginia’s “great goal” of main-
taining an all-male military academy that uses the adversative method 
“is not substantially advanced by women’s categorical exclusion, in to-
 
195 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996); id. at n.6 (“The Court has thus far 
reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national 
origin . . . .”). 
196 See id. at 519 (framing the question before the Court as whether “the Constitution’s equal 
protection guarantee precludes Virginia from reserving exclusively to men the unique 
educational opportunities VMI affords”). 
197 Id. at 535 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
198 Id. at 540. 
199 Id. at 542. 
200 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542. 
201 Id. at 544; id. at 544 n.13. 
202 Id. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). 
203 Id. at 542 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tal disregard of their individual merit . . . .”204  Virginia establishes that 
gender-based stereotypes cannot justify gender-based classifications 
and that institutions must base decisions on the actual individual 
qualities of applicants rather than categorical assumptions.  Again, 
this principle is only stronger in the race context due to the more rig-
id standard of review that applies to racial classifications.205 
The “external legitimacy” doctrine runs afoul of the principles 
announced in Hogan and reinforced in Virginia.  In particular, it op-
erates on the premise that certain positions should be available (only 
or preferably) to individuals who share the same racial identity as the 
predominant racial identity of the community to be served.  Follow-
ing our hypothetical, the African-American applicant will be selected 
for the position because of the marginal increase in the harmony be-
tween the racial identity of the teachers and the parents.  In practical 
terms, therefore, the position is functionally available to the applicant 
who can enhance the extent to which the employer reflects the racial 
composition of the parents. 
But, all other qualities being equal, the African-American and 
Asian-American applicants should stand on the same footing as it per-
tains to their prospective ability to be effectively teach and be mem-
bers of the educational community.  In short, the employment role 
should be open to both on full and equal terms, without the position 
being the presumptive or exclusive position of the applicant who 
happens to have the same racial identity as the clients or customers. 
C.  Judicial Costs: The Judicial Validation Problem 
The reality is that assumptions about race still exist in the world.206  
Race informs, whether consciously or not, a variety of judgments and 
decisions, from opinions about people (e.g., whether they are dan-
gerous or trustworthy, whether they are hard-working or lazy, wheth-
er they are “legal” or not, etc.),207 informal behaviors (e.g., whether 
 
204 Id. at 546.  At oral argument, counsel for the Department of Justice suggested that VMI 
advanced stereotypical views of men as well:  “[I] don’t think that you can have single sex 
education that offers to men a stereotypical view of this is what men do,” i.e. participate in 
the military and engage in rigorous training.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, United 
States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (Nos. 94–1941, 94–2107). 
205 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 n.6 (“The Court has thus far reserved most stringent judicial 
scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin . . . .”). 
206 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“It would ignore reality to suggest that 
racial and ethnic prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices 
have been eliminated.”). 
207 See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law:  Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of 
Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1311 (2004) (holding that certain races or ethnic groups 
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we are going to cross the street or tighten our grip on our belongings 
when a member of a given race approaches, whether we are going to 
stop and help a pedestrian or stranded driver, whether we are going 
to monitor with greater care a worker who is in or around our home, 
etc.),208 and more formal judgments (e.g., whether we are going to 
hire or promote someone, whether we are going to extend an offer of 
admission to someone, whether we are going to vote for someone, 
etc.).209  It is undeniable that race continues to matter in a host of dai-
ly and important ways.210 
The Supreme Court has understood that racial stereotypes persist 
in modern American society.  But, in addressing its role in relation to 
these stereotypes, the Court has made clear that the courts cannot 
endorse or facilitate the operation of those stereotypes.  In Palmore v. 
Sidoti, the Court was faced with a case in which a white mother had 
the custody of her child revoked because she remarried a black 
man.211  The courts below ruled that the custody determination was 
appropriate because the interracial remarriage was against the wishes 
of the father, and would subject the child to social harms.212  The Su-
 
have been and continue to be stereotyped as disloyal); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. 
Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1548–49 (2011) 
(“[L]argely absent from these debates is the fact that law enforcement personnel routine-
ly employ Latino racial identity as a basis for determining whether a person is undocu-
mented or illegal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial 
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:  United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren 
v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1038 (2010) 
(noting that “[i]mmigration officers today often rely on crude undocumented immigrant 
profiles with race at their core”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
1575, 1576 (2002) (suggesting that post-September 11, “persons who appear ‘Middle 
Eastern, Arab, or Muslim’ . . . are identified as terrorists, and are disidentified as citi-
zens”). 
208 See Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils:  Anti-Black Theorizing and the Black 
Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1995) (commenting that when white cou-
ples encounter a black male on the street, “men often clutch their women while the 
women clutch their purses”); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient:  Trayvon Martin and Implic-
it Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1580–82 (2013) (noting that in-
dividuals are generally more likely to “perceive mildly aggressive behavior as more threat-
ening when performed by a Black person than when performed by a White person”). 
209 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 119 at 1292–93 (stating that attempts to 
repudiate certain stereotypes may result in confirming another); Emma Reece Denny, 
Mo’ Claims Mo’ Problems:  How Courts Ignore Multiple Claimants in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 30 LAW & INEQ. 339, 347–48 (2012) (“Research focusing on stereotypes of 
those who fall into more than one minority category show that non-White women and 
men face different stereotypes than White women and men, and that these stereotypes 
are more likely to lead to negative discrimination.”). 
210 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (observing that, in our society, “race 
unfortunately still matters”). 
211 466 U.S. at 430–31. 
212 Id. at 431. 
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preme Court reversed, holding that the father’s or potential social 
reactions were insufficient to divest the mother of custody.  In partic-
ular, the Court acknowledged that racial stereotypes exist generally 
and that the child in question may be stigmatized,213 but declared that 
“[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it 
tolerate them.”214  Put differently, the Court declared, “Private biases 
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or 
indirectly, give them effect.”215 
Justice Jackson similarly expressed concern in Korematsu that the 
courts were being used as an instrument to enshrine into the Consti-
tution the stereotype that individuals of Japanese race were disloyal 
and suspicious.  He wrote, “[I]f we cannot confine military expedi-
ents by the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to 
approve all that the military may deem expedient.  That is what the 
Court appears to be doing, whether consciously or not.”216  Further 
into his Korematsu dissent, Justice Jackson explained that “once a ju-
dicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to 
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that 
the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has 
validated the principle of racial discrimination” that could be ex-
panded in future circumstances.217  That principle will not only grow 
in substantive form, but will not be constrained temporally by the ex-
igencies of the moment:  “if we review and approve [racial discrimi-
nation], that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitu-
tion.”218  We now know that Justice Jackson was correct,219 and the 
Court as an institution and the Constitution as a shield of liberty suf-
 
213 See id. at 433 (“It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices do not 
exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been eliminated. There is a risk 
that a child living with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pres-
sures and stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or 
ethnic origin.”). 
214 Id. 
215 Id.  Public discrimination only facilitates private discrimination, creating a harmful feed-
back loop.  See I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment:  Race, Citizenship, and the 
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2011) (noting in particular that 
“police profiling creates damaging feedback loop effects”). 
216 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244–45 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
217 Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
218 Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
219 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a (2006) (apologizing for internment of individuals of Japanese 
ancestry during World War II); 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989, (recognizing that “a grave injustice 
was done to both citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the evacua-
tion, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II” and that these actions 
“were motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political 
leadership”). 
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fered as a result of the Court’s willingness to tolerate categorical views 
premised on race.220 
In the public accommodations context, the Court has refused to 
credit external, customer racial preferences, even when grounded in 
evidence.  For example, in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court ad-
dressed the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a restaurant 
in Birmingham, Alabama that refused to serve African Americans in 
the restaurant.221  The proprietor of the restaurant stated that only 
serving African Americans outside was premised on external reac-
tions, not internal bias:  permitting African-American customers in-
side, he said, would repel white customers and result in a loss of a 
“substantial amount of business.”222  “I would refuse to serve a drunk-
en man or a profane man or a colored man or anyone I felt would 
damage my business,” he added.223  If the inside portion of the restau-
rant were to be opened to African Americans, he claimed, “his res-
taurant would be flooded with black customers . . . and his white cus-
tomers would cease their patronage as a result.”224 
The Court held that the statute applied to the restaurant, and was 
unmoved by the externally-justified exclusion of African-American 
customers from inside service.225  Deborah Rhode explains the courts’ 
refusal to accept private bias in cases of racial discrimination, particu-
larly in the employment context: 
During the early Civil Rights era, Southern employers often argued that 
hiring blacks would be financially ruinous [as] white customers would go 
elsewhere. In rejecting such customer preference defenses, Congress and 
the courts recognized that the most effective way of combating prejudice 
was to deprive people of the option to indulge it.226 
 
220 See Breyer, supra note 94. 
221 379 U.S. 294, 295–97 (1964). 
222 Id. at 297. 
223 Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 YALE L.J. 1844, 1855 n.52 
(2009) (quoting RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS:  THE 
HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 78 (2001)). 
224 Id. (quoting CORTNER, supra note 223 at 66). 
225 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303–05. 
226 Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1065 (2009).  For a 
modern example of courts rejecting customer preferences as a valid justification for race-
based employment actions, see Ray v. Univ. of Arkansas, 868 F.Supp. 1104, 1126–27 
(E.D. Ark. 1994) (“[I]t is clear that there are some students at UAPB with a predisposi-
tion of racial animus toward white officers . . . . This form of ‘client’ preference is no 
more permissible than any other, and will not justify the different treatment of white of-
ficers.”). 
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In short, the courts cannot give legal credit or practical effect to ra-
cial stereotypes, to the extent that such biases continue to exist and 
inform decisions in society.227 
This principle easily reaches the “external legitimacy” doctrine, as 
our hypothetical demonstrates.  An employer may want to hire an Af-
rican-American employee to ostensibly satisfy a predominantly Afri-
can-American parent base.  And this decision may not be predicated 
upon any personally-held positive view of African Americans or nega-
tive view of applicants of other races, such as Asian-Americans.  
Moreover, there very well may be an empirical foundation for the be-
lief that African-American parents respond better to African-
American teachers. 
But, the rulings of the Court command that the courts cannot 
sanction social assumptions about the attributes of members of a par-
ticular race, whether the assumptions are held by school officials or 
the parents, or whether the assumptions are backed by data.  In short, 
racial stereotypes may exist, but the courts cannot actively validate or 
perpetuate them.  The “external legitimacy” embodies racial stereo-
types, as Part II.A.1 (viz. desired race) and Part II.A.3 (viz. non-
desired race) suggest. 
*  *  * 
To summarize the problems with the “external legitimacy” doc-
trine:  with respect to the candidates, it presumes solely on the basis 
of racial identity that an employee will generate good will on the part 
of constituents who share the same race, compels this employee to act 
and perform according to these race-based presumptions, presumes 
solely on the basis of racial identity that an applicant of a different 
race cannot generate to the same degree buy-in from the external 
community, imposes a fixed meaning on racial identity of the appli-
cants, and denies equal consideration to the non-desired applicant 
and excludes that applicant from the position.  With respect to socie-
ty, it deprives the employer and the external constituency of the op-
portunity to understand that an individual of a different race may be 
able to serve the interests and needs of the constituency, and reserves 
social roles for members of particular races.  With respect to the 
courts, it draws the courts in to validate and advance private stereo-
types predicated on race. 
 
227 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“The impact [of race-based seg-
regation] is greater when it has the sanction of the law . . . .”). 
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III.  APPLICATION 
Part II discussed the constitutional and social issues with the “ex-
ternal legitimacy” doctrine to show the problematic nature of racial 
mirroring.  In Part III, I will apply the principles of Part II to the situ-
ation described at the beginning of this Article:  the suggestion that 
police departments reflect the racial composition of the served com-
munities.  Placing the requirement against these principles may help 
explain exactly why this seemingly straightforward and sensible pro-
posal is constitutionally unsound and counterproductive.  This analy-
sis also may help us further conceptualize the contents of and prob-
lems with racial mirroring more generally. 
This Part also identifies important limits on the application of the 
problems with racial mirroring.  The problems with racial mirroring 
apply, in theory, to hiring preferences in the tribal context and to 
race-conscious admissions in higher education.  But Congress has 
made clear that tribal hiring preferences are shielded from anti-
discrimination provisions.  And race-conscious admissions policies are 
justified on the basis of the educational benefits that flow from a di-
verse student body, not a matching of the racial diversity of the stu-
dent body to the racial diversity of the local community or nation.  
Racial mirroring considerations may be useful nonetheless in identi-
fying the costs of these approved forms of discrimination. 
A.  Law Enforcement 
Each of the principles articulated in Part II applies to the sugges-
tion that police officers should reflect the primary racial identity of 
the communities which they serve. 
To begin, the suggestion presumes that officers who reflect the 
racial composition of the residents possess the ability to build trust 
and generate good will among the served public, or at least do so to a 
greater degree than officers of other races.  This belief lacks eviden-
tiary support.  In the aftermath of Michael Brown’s death in Fergu-
son, Missouri, the Washington Post reported that “there’s no conclu-
sive evidence to show that white and black police officers treat 
suspects differently . . . .”228  “[I]f anything,” the report continued, 
“some of the studies show that black officers can be harder on 
 
228 Lydia DePillis, Do Diverse Police Forces Treat Their Communities More Fairly Than Almost-All-
White Ones Like Ferguson’s?, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2014, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/08/22/do-diverse-police-
forces-treat-their-communities-more-fairly-than-all-white-ones-like-fergusons/. 
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black criminal suspects.”229  Accordingly, the presumption about of-
ficer buy-in would be predicated upon race alone and not upon the 
individual qualities of the officers or upon evidence of officer behav-
ior. 
Next, performance is expected of the hired officers and these ex-
pectations arise only by virtue of the shared racial identity of the of-
ficers and the residents.  An officer, in other words, would not be 
hired or promoted merely because of the shared racial identity, but 
because of what may spring from that shared racial identity.  The 
hired or promoted officer would be expected to produce the trust 
and goodwill desired by the police department. 
Moreover, the suggestion presumes that officers of races that do 
not align with the primary race of the residents are not as able to en-
gender trust among the served community.  If there was not a belief 
that officers of a different racial composition could not develop this 
affection, the suggestion would be superfluous.  The flip-side of the 
premise that racial alignment would produce a healthy police force is 
the presumption that officers out of sync with the residents’ racial 
composition would not yield that assurance of effective and fair polic-
ing. 
In addition, officers may be reassigned, not promoted, or not 
hired on account of the presumption that they lack the ability to cre-
ate “external legitimacy.”  Equal opportunity in employment is there-
by denied.  It is true that, in circumstances other than termination or 
a refusal to hire, officers may still be employed and that the harm 
may be limited to reassignment as opposed to employment altogeth-
er.  But one can imagine a situation in which departments, such as 
smaller departments, have a limited ability to shuffle officers around 
to match the racial composition of the community.  In this situation, 
the “external legitimacy” principle, if implemented, could lead to 
non-promotion or non-hiring. 
The suggestion also attaches an attribute—ability to produce posi-
tive relationships, or not—to the officers’ race.  The suggestion there-
fore removes from the officers the authority to determine whether 
their race will be assessed, and to define the meaning of their race.  
 
229 Id.  Put bluntly by The Atlantic’s Ta-Nehisi Coates, referencing police officers in a majority-
black suburb of Washington, DC, “Black Cops Can Be Brutal, Too.”  Transcript Interview 
by Norah O’Donnel with Ta-Nehisi Coates, CBS FACE THE NATION (Nov. 30, 2014), avail-
able at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-november-30-2014-
crump-tillis-peters-cupich/. 
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Racial identity and the contents of that identity should be left to the 
individual.230 
Moving to social costs, the residents are deprived of the oppor-
tunity to appreciate that officers of any race may be able to effectively 
and fairly serve them.  The suggestion thus perpetuates harmful be-
liefs that only individuals of the same race can do so, and reinforces, 
rather than breaks down, barriers to cross-racial understanding. 
In addition, the suggestion would effectively require that spaces 
on the force be functionally reserved for individuals on the basis of 
race, and specifically the racial composition of the residents.  It is 
true, however, that this general concern is that social roles—not as-
signments once those roles are obtained—are deemed to be the ex-
clusive or presumptive province of members of a particular race.  In 
the police department context, one may say that the social role of po-
lice officer is open to all, and only particular assignments are closed 
off or open to individuals on the basis of race.  Accordingly, the rela-
tionship between this particular issue and the “external legitimacy” 
principle may be seen as limited.  But, as noted above, when the de-
partment is small or the served community racially homogeneous, re-
assignment may not be possible and the role of police officer may be 
reserved altogether. 
The third general problem with racial mirroring—the use of 
courts as conduits for racial stereotypes—is applicable to the sugges-
tion if the courts condone the suggestion.  As noted in Part I, courts 
have bought the external legitimacy rationale in the police context. 
In sum, the “external legitimacy” doctrine applied to law en-
forcement embodies racial stereotypes, retards social progress, and 
breaches the Equal Protection Clause’s essential command that indi-
viduals be treated as individuals rather than members of a racial 
group with monolithic attributes, abilities, or experiences.   
B.  Tribal Employment 
The “external legitimacy” doctrine may reach other practices or 
policies in which the racial composition of one group is adjusted so as 
 
230 See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:  SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 
333 (2003) (“A well-ordered multiracial society ought to allow its members free entry into 
and exit from racial categories, even if the choices they make clash with traditional un-
derstandings of who is ‘black’ and who is ‘white,’ and even if, despite making such choic-
es in good faith, individuals mislead observers who rely on conventional racial signal-
ing.”). 
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to reflect the racial composition of another group.  But it is im-
portant to recognize the limits of the reach of the doctrine. 
First, the principles of racial mirroring apply to tribal employ-
ment, but, by statute, Congress has insulated tribes and other em-
ployers “on or near” Indian tribes from general anti-discrimination 
provisions.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), by its 
own terms, exempts tribes from Title VII231 and also authorizes em-
ployers “on or near” Indian lands to favor Native-American appli-
cants.  More specifically, to promote tribal sovereignty232 and the eco-
nomic independence233 of Native Americans,234 Title VII expressly 
provides that the statute’s prohibition against discrimination in em-
ployment shall not “apply to any business or enterprise on or near an 
Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employ-
ment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferen-
tial treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living 
on or near a reservation.”235  Accordingly, to the extent that a tribal 
employer engages in racial mirroring, Title VII cannot provide any 
relief for aggrieved parties.  In addition, according to the Supreme 
Court, “Indian” is not a racial classification, but a political one.236 
 
231 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).   
232 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545–46 (1974) (“This [preference] reveals a clear 
congressional recognition, within the framework of Title VII, of the unique legal status of 
tribal and reservation-based activities.”).  The author of the preference, Senator Karl 
Mundt, declared that the preference “would provide to American Indian tribes in their 
capacity as a political entity . . . to conduct their own affairs and economic activities with-
out consideration of the [anti-discrimination] provisions of [Title VII].”  Dille v. Council 
of Energy Res. Tribes, 801 F.2d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 13702 
(1964)). 
233 The Senate sponsor, Hubert Humphrey, stated that the preference “is consistent with the 
Federal Government’s policy of encouraging Indian employment . . . .”  Morton, 417 U.S. 
at 546 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964)).  Senator Mundt stated that the prefer-
ence “will assure our American Indians of the continued right to protect and promote 
their own interests and to benefit from Indian preference programs now in operation or 
later to be instituted.”  Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 871–72 (2003) (em-
phasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
234 This bifurcated understanding also is noted by a federal district court.  See Dille v. Council 
of Energy Resource Tribes, 610 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Colo. 1985) (outlining the two pur-
poses of the federal statute). 
235 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (2008). 
236 See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (“Federal regulation of Indian 
tribes . . . is governance of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as 
legislation of a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians.’”); Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (“The 
preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it ap-
plies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.  This operates to exclude many in-
dividuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’  In this sense, the preference is po-
litical rather than racial in nature.”). 
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While the Indian preference is protected from challenge under 
Title VII, the preference is not without significant costs.  It is im-
portant to acknowledge the constitutional and social problems with 
the preference.  This is not to suggest that the purported benefits to 
tribal sovereignty or tribal economic independence are not worth 
these costs; only that the costs at least must be understood and ap-
praised in any substantive discussion of the preference.  The racial 
mirroring conception is useful therefore as a means by which to ap-
preciate these costs, even if the preference itself cannot be contested 
in the courts by reference to racial mirroring. 
Indeed, an employer “on or near” tribal lands may, as with any 
other employer, hire or promote a member of a federally enrolled 
tribe in order to cater to the predominantly Native-American clien-
tele that the employer serves.237  Writing about a precursor to the In-
dian preference in Title VII, Felix S. Cohen—revered as the “Black-
stone of American Indian law”238—explained that:  
[M]ost American communities pick their own teachers, village clerks, po-
licemen, and other public servants, giving a preference to whatever local 
talent is available.  In an Indian community, however, such jobs . . . are 
generally filled . . . by persons . . . who have no familiarity with local con-
ditions, customs, ways, and people, and who often cannot even under-
stand the community’s language.239 
An employer of similar mind may elect to hire or promote a Na-
tive-American candidate on the reasoning that the Native-American 
candidate has this knowledge, where the employment decision is 
premised on the Indian status of the candidate and not any particu-
larized evidence about the candidate’s interest in or experience with 
tribal members.  Accordingly, the Indian preference may, at least in 
some circumstances, allow employers to make an employment deci-
sion on the categorical presumption that Native Americans possess 
 
237 While the preference itself enables eligible employers to hire “any individual,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(i), in reality it has been invoked to hire members of federally enrolled tribes.  
See Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 154 F.3d 
1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1998) (presenting an example of a preference given to member of 
Navajo tribe for hiring purposes and deciding it did not fall within the statutory excep-
tion); Morton, 417 U.S. at 555 (upholding preference open to any qualified “Indian”). 
238 Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense:  Toward a New Realism in Federal 
Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 650 (2006); see also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF 
FEATHERS:  AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 51 (1995) 
(“[P]ractitioners and scholars of Indian law owe [a huge debt] to the late Felix Cohen.”). 
239 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953:  A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 
YALE L.J. 348, 361 (1953).  As an example, Freya Ray writes that the “Indian require-
ments” may “include factors such as cultural awareness and language skills.”  Freya Ray, 
Comment, Preserving Indian Preference for Native American Self-Governance, 36 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 223, 239 (2012). 
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certain valued qualities.  The employer will expects the candidate to 
exhibit those presumed traits, for example, the familiarity and lan-
guage skills mentioned by Cohen.  The employer, at the same time, 
presumes the absence of this familiarity and language skills in non-
Native candidates.  In giving effect to these presumptions, the em-
ployer denies equal consideration to the non-Native candidate.  The 
employer ties specific content to the status of the candidate, depriv-
ing the candidate of the ability to determine whether and how the 
status matters. 
Moreover, Native Americans are deprived of the opportunity to 
understand that non-Natives may possess the desired familiarity and 
language skills despite their different status.  The presumptions effec-
tively reserve employment positions for Native candidates.  Finally, 
the employer can use the courts as conduits for these presumptions, 
by way of the courts simply recognizing that these practices are out-
side of the bounds of Title VII’s anti-discrimination standards.  The 
courts likely also cannot invoke the Equal Protection Clause as a way 
to address these employment decisions, unless the employers are 
state actors.240 
In sum, while Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause are gen-
erally unavailable as the vehicles for mounting any challenge to this 
practice, there are numerous costs that lie on a side of the ledger.241 
C.  Affirmative Action 
There may be interest in ascertaining whether a doctrine dealing 
with race can be used as an instrument to challenge race-conscious 
admissions policies.  The simple answer is that racial mirroring can-
not be employed to invalidate race-conscious admissions in higher 
 
240 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular charac-
ter that is prohibited [by the Fourteenth Amendment].  Individual invasion of individual 
rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”). 
241 A thoughtful commentator asks whether the Indian preference should be accepted, not 
as a means by which to effectuate a preference for individuals from federally enrolled 
tribes, but as a “jobs program.”  To this, I offer two responses.  First, this neutral construc-
tion of the preference still leaves open the very real possibility that an employer may se-
lect a candidate because of a blanket bias and not because of the individualized charac-
teristics of the candidates.  Second, and relatedly, the costs of the preference would still 
exist even if the preference has an economic or development justification. Indeed, tribal 
sovereignty and tribal economic independence are, by themselves, worthy goals.  The ad-
dition of a third objective—tribal employment—is also important, though does not elim-
inate the costs enumerated herein.  Whether those goals offset the costs is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  This Article only identifies some costs of the preference without 
making any comment on the merits of the purposes of the preference or their signifi-
cance relative to the costs. 
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education insofar as how such admissions policies are specifically au-
thorized by the Supreme Court. 
In 1978, Justice Powell, writing the controlling242 opinion for the 
Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,243 found only one 
compelling state interest for taking race into account in higher edu-
cation admissions:  producing the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body.244  Twenty-five years later, in 2003, the Court in Grutter 
v. Bollinger reviewed the constitutionality of the University of Michi-
gan Law School’s race-conscious admissions plan and in doing so re-
affirmed that student body diversity in higher education is a compel-
ling reason to use racial classification.245   The Court appreciated, for 
example, that racial diversity in higher education facilitates cross-
racial understanding, breaks down racial stereotypes, and allows 
graduates to be better prepared for a diverse workforce and for lead-
ership positions in diverse employment contexts, including in the 
military.246  The Court, paying special attention to the relationship be-
tween the First Amendment and institutions of higher education, as-
serted that it would defer to the law school’s view that diversity, 
broadly defined, is essential to its educational mission.247 
The Grutter Court also deemed the law school’s admissions policy 
to be narrowly tailored in furtherance of its compelling state interest.  
The law school sought to admit a “critical mass” of underrepresented 
minority groups, e.g., African Americans, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans.248  A “critical mass,” according to the law school, is the 
point at which a student from an underrepresented minority group 
does not feel isolated or that he or she feels compelled to express 
views stereotypical of his or her racial group.249  Once a “critical mass” 
is present, the law school argued, a student from an underrepresent-
ed minority group no longer feels isolated or compelled to be a 
spokesperson for his or her race; the student instead is free to articu-
late individual viewpoints that may differ from the stereotypical view-
 
242 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (“Justice Powell’s opinion announcing 
the judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-
conscious admissions policies.”). 
243 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
244 Id. at 311–15 (Opinion of Powell, J.). 
245 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
246 Id. at 330–32. 
247 Id. at 328. 
248 Id. at 316. 
249 Id. at 318–19. 
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point associated with his or her race.250  In that sense, the educational 
benefits of diversity may be achieved because other students may 
come to realize that students from the underrepresented minority 
community do not hold stereotypical or monolithic ideas.251 
The “critical mass” theory nonetheless has problems.  For exam-
ple, it presumes that a student from an underrepresented minority 
group possesses viewpoints that will enrich the student body or that 
will break down stereotypes; expects the student from an underrepre-
sented minority group to articulate those unique viewpoints in order 
for the benefits of diversity to flourish; presumes that individuals 
from other racial groups do not have viewpoints that will enrich stu-
dent body diversity or that will break down stereotypes; denies equal 
consideration in admissions to applicants from these racial groups; 
drives the meaning of the applicants’ racial identity by presuming the 
existence or non-existence of viewpoints on the basis of racial identity 
alone; and utilizes courts as a means by which to validate the stereo-
types.252 
While the principles animating racial mirroring may apply to 
some degree to race-conscious admissions, affirmative action is not 
racial mirroring which occurs when the racial composition of one 
group is adjusted so as to reflect the racial composition of a second 
group.  Affirmative action, as allowed by the Court in Bakke and 
Grutter, is not an attempt by colleges and universities to match the ra-
cial composition of the student body to the racial composition of the 
local or national community.253  Instead, such policies are permissible 
 
250 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 747 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(explaining how a critical mass aims to ensure that minority students “feel comfortable 
discussing issues freely based on their personal experiences”). 
251 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333. 
252 It may not deprive students of the understanding that individuals from non-
underrepresented minority groups have unique and valuable viewpoints, as those stu-
dents may be admitted by way of a race-neutral admissions policy.  It also does not reserve 
social roles for individuals of certain races.  While admissions in higher education is a ze-
ro-sum game, a student at a certain school may not itself be a “social role,” though stu-
dent at an elite university or in college as a whole may be. 
253 To the extent that any race-conscious actions by schools are premised on attempts to re-
flect the racial makeup of the student body with the local or national population, such ac-
tions should be invalidated as impermissible racial mirroring.  See Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 766–77 (2007) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that, even with “an interest in producing an educational environment 
that reflects the pluralistic society in which our children will live,” to prefer “members of 
any one group for no reason other than race” is unconstitutional); see also Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional command to 
desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must al-
ways reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole.”). 
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to the extent they are designed to produce the educational benefits 
of a diverse student body.254 
Accordingly, there are harms associated with race-conscious ad-
missions, but this Article cannot be used as a way to undue affirmative 
action. 
IV.  THE REMEDY 
If racial mirroring takes race off the table when decisionmakers 
try to obtain certain benefits by way of matching the racial composi-
tion of one group to that of the served constituency, the question be-
comes how decisionmakers can receive those same benefits without 
resorting to race.  Put differently, how can decisionmakers select 
candidates who can generate trust and cooperation among clients in 
a race-neutral fashion?  How else can police departments be assured 
that officers assigned to majority-minority neighborhoods will pro-
duce external affection, without directing that the officers reflect the 
racial makeup of the residents? 
A.  The Rule 
To fashion an acceptable tool with which these entities can fur-
ther their interests while at the same time avoid the problems of ra-
cial mirroring, it is necessary to delve deeper into the problems 
themselves.  At its core, racial mirroring is harmful because entities 
presume, on the basis of racial identity alone, the existence or non-
existence of certain traits.  These are the first and third harms of 
those identified in this Article.  These other identified harms are by-
products of, and thus are secondary to these two, primary harms.  It is 
only because of the operation of the presumptions that individuals 
are expected to perform, that they may be denied equal considera-
tion, that an imposed meaning is given to the individuals’ racial iden-
tities, that social roles are deemed the proper domain of a specific 
race, that prevents others from understanding that the presumptions 
are inaccurate, and that courts are brought in to validate the pre-
sumptions.  These harms only spring from the presumptions them-
selves. 
Accordingly, any remedy must be directed towards the presump-
tions that an individual, because he or she has a certain racial identi-
ty, categorically has or does not have certain attributes or traits.  
Decisionmakers interested in ensuring that individuals have certain 
 
254 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
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traits (e.g., an ability to generate trust and cooperation) for purposes 
of realizing certain benefits from those traits (e.g., greater effective-
ness in performing their functions) should assess whether there is any 
particularized evidence from the individual’s record or materials that 
the individual has or does not have the desired traits.  As Terrence 
Dodd, a black resident of Ferguson, said in response to questions 
about the diversity of the Ferguson police officers, “It don’t make a 
difference what color they are . . . . [I]t’s not about race or none of 
that.  We just need good police officers.”255  More generally, Eugene 
Volokh rightly states that “even when race is correlated with a rele-
vant job characteristic . . . one should just look at that characteristic 
and not use race as a proxy.”256 
This rule has several values.  It disabuses entities of race-based 
presumptions that are harmful themselves and that give rise to addi-
tional harms.  It restores the individual as the determinant of whether 
and to what extent his or her racial identity matters, and what mean-
ing may attach to his or her racial identity.  It affords greater respect 
to the individual, as it does not treat the individual as a person with 
predetermined or monolithic attitudes, attributes, or experiences.  It 
also pays more honest tribute to the constitutional command that in-
dividuals be treated as individuals, not as undifferentiated members 
of a racial group.257 
This is not to pretend that race does not matter in our society.  
Nor is it to suggest that we should close our eyes to racial realities.  
But the harms of racial presumptions, when they occur, must be 
identified and both academics and the courts may be counseled 
against the promotion or adoption, respectively, of those presump-
tions. 
B.  Application 
It may be helpful to explore how this rule would function in actu-
ality.  Instead of relying on racial presumptions, the decisionmaker, 
such as an employer, would review the record (e.g., the applicant’s 
résumé, letters of recommendation, other supporting materials, and 
interview performance) to assess whether the applicant has the inter-
 
255 Art Holliday, Ferguson Police Department Diversity Questioned, KSDK, Aug. 18, 2014, available 
at http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/08/12/ferguson-police-department-
diversity-questioned-officers/13976879. 
256 Volokh, supra note 105 at 2061. 
257 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“[A] university’s admissions program must remain flexible 
enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that 
makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.”). 
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est, ability, and experience to produce trust and cooperation among 
the served public.  Put differently, the employer may examine wheth-
er—by reference to the applicant’s experience, abilities, and person-
ality—the applicant has a demonstrated interest in the served com-
munity, has effective social skills, and is able to engender support and 
trust. 
The class counsel orders issued by Judge Baer and discussed in 
Part I may exemplify how this rule is to apply.  In the class counsel 
context, the touchstone for an inquiry as to whether class counsel 
may fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class is 
whether the attorneys are competent and have any conflicts that 
would impair the ability of any attorney to zealously advocate on be-
half of the class.258  Indeed, an Advisory Committee Note to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)—a relatively new rule created in 2003 
to govern the appointment of class counsel259—“articulates the obliga-
tion of class counsel to represent the interests of the class, as opposed 
to the potentially conflicting interests of individual class members.”260 
To appraise whether class counsel meet this standard, Rule 
23(g)(1)(A) requires courts to examine the following factors:  “the 
work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims 
in the action,” “counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other 
complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action,” 
“counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law,” and “the resources that 
counsel will commit to representing the class . . . .”261  Linda Mullenix 
similarly notes that courts making class counsel adequacy determina-
tions generally have demanded that counsel be “qualified, experi-
enced, and generally able to conduct the litigation,” considering spe-
cifically “class counsel’s competence,” “particular expertise,” 
 
258 See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“[A]dequacy of representation is measured by two standards.  First, class counsel must be 
qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation.  Second, the class 
members must not have interests that are antagonistic to one another.” (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 
852–53 (1999) (pointing out that counsel’s ability to best represent the interests of the 
class were undermined by their “divergent interests” which were “patently at odds” with 
those of the class). 
259 See Sheinberg v. Sorensen, 606 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although questions con-
cerning the adequacy of class counsel were traditionally analyzed under the aegis of the 
adequate representation requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . those questions have, since 
2003, been governed by Rule 23(g).”). 
260 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) Advisory Committee’s Note. 
261 Id. § 23(g)(1)(A). 
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“counsel’s resources,” “possible conflicts of interest with the class[,]” 
and any ethical conduct.262 
To be sure, Rule 23(g)(1)(B) contains a catchall provision that 
enables a judge to weigh anything “pertinent” to class counsel’s abil-
ity to “fairly and adequately” represent the interests of the clients.263  
This is the precise provision that Judge Baer invoked in imposing a 
racial diversity requirement on class counsel.264 
But rather than relying on presumptions premised on race as to 
the adequacy or inadequacy of class counsel premised upon race, 
judges should make individualized determinations as to whether 
counsel possess these general indicia of competence and are without 
conflicts that compromise their ability to fully represent their clients’ 
interests.  As Professor Mullenix argues, “Courts should be required 
to develop a factual, evidentiary record on the adequacy requirement 
and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law based on those 
facts.”265  The evidentiary record would be based on counsels’ “sup-
porting evidence of competency, experience, resources, and con-
flicts”266—not presumptions tied to race. 
In sum, an individualized, appraisal as to whether a candidate has 
the desired qualities allows the decisionmaker to realize the benefits 
from those qualities without running into the numerous problems 
with racial mirroring.267 
 
262 Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously:  The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Liti-
gation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1698–99 (2004) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The author adds that many courts do not engage in 
this searching inquiry, presuming instead the adequacy of counsel.  See id. at 1699–1701. 
263 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) Advisory Committee’s Note. 
264 See Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 1, 12 (2d Cir. 2012). 
265 Mullenix, supra note 262 at 1734. 
266 Id. at 1740. 
267 The racial mirroring doctrine does not apply to race-conscious admissions as those ad-
missions policies have been approved by the Court in Bakke and Grutter.  That said, the 
rule offered here, if implemented, would require college and university admissions offic-
es to base determinations as to whether an applicant will contribute to the diversity of the 
student body on an applicant’s file, such as the applicant’s personal statement, work his-
tory, letters of recommendation, or other similar aspects of the application.  These mate-
rials would provide an individualized, evidentiary foundation for a conclusion that the 
applicant has diverse viewpoints, experiences, or attitudes, and thus is worthy of a “plus.”  
In other words, the file, not the racial self-identification of the applicant, would be the 
touchstone for the student body diversity inquiry.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 338 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of an admissions system in which “[a]ll 
applicants have the opportunity to highlight their own potential diversity contributions 
through the submission of a personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay 
describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the 
Law School”). 
1392 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
CONCLUSION 
Race is a social construct that, by itself, has no meaning.268  An un-
deniable aspect of American history is the assignment of particular 
meanings to race:  the divine dominance of whites, and the inferiority 
of all others, especially African Americans and Native Americans.  In 
America’s history, race was more than a social construct, but a divid-
ing line between the “superior” and the subjugated.  The painful past 
and its legacy should not be brushed aside, and shall remain an im-
portant lesson in the lasting flaws in the Framers’ otherwise lofty con-
cepts of liberty and equality, the deficiencies of the Framers them-
selves,269 and what harm can come of categorical racial views and 
practices. 
Today, the vestiges of that improper thinking and behavior re-
main; racial discrimination, while less pervasive and more implicit by 
nature, is not a relic of the past.  Race continues to inform and affect 
views of others, and it opens and closes doors of opportunity.  More 
than anything, race is not a social construct, but a powerful stimulant 
in American society—one that tends to excite and break apart the 
people.  “[R]ace unfortunately still matters,” the Supreme Court has 
stated.270 
The question becomes, how do we become closer to the point in 
which racial differences are irrelevant to our abilities to perceive and 
treat each other? 
In narrow form, this Article identifies three spheres of constitu-
tional and social harms that stem from the practice of racial mirror-
ing, defined herein as altering the racial composition of one group to 
reflect or match the racial composition of a second group.  The spe-
cific conclusion that should be drawn from this Article is that the “ex-
 
268 See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 73 (1996) 
(“Race is nothing more than what society and the law say it is.”); Ian F. Haney López, The 
Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10–16, 46–53 (1994) (discussing how race is not a foregone natural or 
biological determination, but rather a social phenomenon over which an individual has 
some degree of choice); Managing an Identity Crisis:  Forum Guide to Implementing New Fed-
eral Race and Ethnicity Categories, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (Oct. 2008), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/rediguide/exhibit4_1.asp (“Assigning a race and ethnicity 
to an individual is a somewhat arbitrary exercise because these are not scientific or an-
thropological categories.”). 
269 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Unconstitutionality of Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 28 
(2012) (“The Framers’ revolutionary and generous concept of liberty did not extend to 
‘blacks’ or ‘Negroes,’ who were in the United States as slave laborers.  Instead, it expressly 
permitted and perpetuated slavery.” (citations omitted)). 
270 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
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ternal legitimacy” doctrine is a form of racial mirroring and is thus 
unsustainable on constitutional and social grounds. 
The broader ambition of this Article is to help lay the groundwork 
for a constitutional and social rule that forbids the use of all categori-
cal racial presumptions.  It endeavors to make the case that, because 
of these harms, categorical racial preferences must cede to individu-
alized evaluations.  The Court has recognized that “[i]f our society is 
to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize 
that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress 
and causes continued hurt and injury.”271  This Article seeks to give 
full meaning to this principle and to thereby accelerate the moment 
when individuals will be treated as individuals. 
 
271 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1991). 
